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One of the basic principles of Economics is Voluntary exchange
is beneficial to each party involved., i.e. we can gain through
trading with others. The rapid sustained economic growth during 1950
to 1970 should be attributed, at least partially, to the systematic
and considerable reduction in trade barrier of trade and capital
movements. The slow-down in world GNP growth after 1973, on the other
hand, is possibly due to the rising pressure of protectionism. Due to
the prohibition against unilateral raising of tariff according to GATT
articles, the pressure generally give rise to the erection of non-
tariff barriers (NTBs). Of all the NTBs, and Voluntary export
restraint (VER) (or Orderly market arrangement, OMA) are the means of
restrictions that are easier to be applied to the exporting countries.
Lately, we see the widely application of VER from the developed
countries (LDs) to the lower developing countries (LDCs), and it has
now constituted a major component of the "New Protectionism.
It is quite obvious that different import restriction policies
will generally bring different impact on both importing and exporting
countries on the level of domestic and import price, level of
2consumption, import and even market structures. In this respect, many
scholars have contributed much in investigating the non-equivalence of
tariff, global quota (GQ) and VER under various assumptions from the
theoretical point of view. Also well reached is the empirical works
that have been carried out to test the theoretical implications on the
impacts of voluntary export restraints on the compositions and quality
of import goods. However, there is a room for comparison of different
import restriction policies impacts on the exporting countries and the
exported goods. This paper is aimed at filling this gap in choosing
Hong Kong as the representative of exporting country and clothing as
the representative of trading commodity. The reasons for choosing Hong
Kong as the place to be studied are: First, Hong Kong engaged in trade
as her major source of income since the early fifties. The government
has comprehensive and accessible records of the importing and
exporting data from the fifties up to today, which is important for
any empirical study. Second, Hong Kong is the leading exporter of
clothing in the world since the sixties, and the industries continues
to generate the greatest amount of export earnings among Hong Kong's
manufacturing industries. The industry is also the largest in terms of
employment, employing 301,654 workers in June 1987 or 33.7% of the
manufacturing labour force. On the other hand, clothing is chosen,
3because it is of considerable importance in the world trade. As
Keesing and Wolf (1980) has pointed out, this industry accounts for
large percentages of employment, manufacturing outputs and exports, in
both developed and developing countries. Above all, it is the industry
that has phenomenal growth in imports of industrial countries before
the quotas are stricter, i.e. before 1976. The current value of
imports increases from 0.28 billion dollars in 1963 to 7.09 billion US
dollars in 1976. Moreover, because of the large share of employment
and even value of output of the industry even in developed countries,
the high rate of penetration of clothing imports can hardly be
tolerated by importing countries, The bargaining power of special
interest group organized by the domestic industry in no doubt has
great influence on the direction of the trade policies, making
clothing products subject to import restriction polices frequently.
The many cases of restriction on the products is valuable in providing
a basis for detail analysis on the policies impacts.
Before we actually examine the situation, I think it shou-ld be
beneficial to have a overall review of Hong Kong's clothing industry
and the literatures in trade restriction so that we have a rather
complete picture of what we are going to discuss.
Scholars have long noticed the different impacts on importing and
4exporting countries when different import policies are in use. At
first, there attention focused on the question of non-equivalence of
tariff and global quota. They investigate the situation theoretically
under' alternative assumptions on market structures (Bhagwati 65, 68
Mc Culloch and Johnson, 1973), uncertainty (Fishelson and Flatters,
1975 Pelcovits, 1976 Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1977) and retaliation
(Rodriguez, 1974 Tower, 1975). The conclusion can be summarized in
words: The equivalence of Global Quota and Tariff is just a special
situation when the market structures are perfectly competitive and
there are no problems of dynamic adjustment and uncertainty. As VER
became more and more important as the major tool in restricting
import, several scholars compared this new tool to the traditional
ones. C. Fred Bergsten (1975) started the non-equivalence discussion
of import Quotas and VER in his classical paper On the non-
equivalence of Import Quota and 'voluntary' export restraints, he
clarified the meaning of VER, compared the relative effectiveness of
VER and GQs in controlling the level of imports and discussed the
distributional effect, trade policy effect of the devices. The main
point of interest is VERs are inherently less effective in achieving
import restriction purpose when compared to GQs, in view of (1)
Technical difficulty to control exports than imports. (2.) Asymmetrical
5motivations (3) Impossibility of VER to cover all suppliers (4)
Possibility of transshipments (5) Looser import restriction terms of
VER. Followed him, Wendy E. Takacs (1978) made an additional step to
examine the question more theoretically. She analysed the situation
under different assumptions against market structures: competition
versus monopoly in domestic production in importing and exporting
countries. Her conclusion is VER leads to a higher import price than
the tariff or import quota when all markets are competitive, when
domestic production alone is monopolized, or when either importing or
exporting is monopolized. T. Murray, W. Schmidt and I. Walter (1983)
supplemented her analysis in considering a situation when a dominant
monopolist supplier is present. They concluded that the import quota
and VER will be equivalent provided that the elasticity of demand
facing the dominant supplier is less than unity and the market share
of the dominant supplier is large enough. Later, the phenomena of
improved import quality was observed among those under quantitative
restriction agreement. Some literatures emerged to explain the
situation. Falvey (1979), Rodrigre (1979) and Van Cott (1980) provided
three different models: Falvay analysed the case of fixed quality for
each imported good. He suggested that due to the relative price change
of items within the import restricted product category under
6quantitative restrictions or specific tariff, there will be a natural
tendency for exporter to shift the composition of goods towards a
higher proportion of its relatively more expensive items, while value
restriction and ad valorem tariff will not cause this result.
Rodriguez, on the other hand, considered a single importing product
where competitive firms can choose the optimal quality. He showed
under his model that an ad valorem tariff will not affect the quality
level chosen by producers, while in the presence of a binding quota or
VER on imports, the quality content will be increased, i.e. Quantity
control allows for more imports of services than the equivalent ad
valorem tariff. The empirical work to support the proposition of
quality up-grading in face of quantity restriction was done by
Feenstra, R. C. in 1985. He analysed the impact of VER on Japanese
auto market by using hedonic regressions. Feenstra estimated the
degree of product up-grading that occurred in Japanese cars exported
to the U.S. market. As a result, he reached a conclusion that two-
third rise in import prices are attributed to quality improvement and
the other one third is a price increase for which the customers are
not compensated. In 1986, Bee Yan Au and Mark J. Roberts examines the
situation in U.S. footwear import in the period surrounding 77-81
using a different approach: index number. They reached a similar
7conclusion that import bundle upgrading was observed in most quota
categories throughout the OMA period and accounts for 12 percent of
the observed rise in the average price of footwear import. There have
also other empirical studies on the effect of VER and import quota on
export price and quality for the case of Hong Kong. Of special
interest were written by Yiu Wong (1986) and Yun-Wing Sung (1988).
Quality upgrading was found in both papers.
Next, we are going to have a brief discussion on Hong Kong's
clothing industry. The first export restraint agreement on clothing
date back to 1958, where restriction on clothing is through the
calculation of equivalent yard of fabric used in production. Since
then, restriction agreements for clothing has been reached with USA
(1962), Canada (1962), Norway (1962), West Germany (1962), Italy
(1965), Benelux (1966), Sweden (1968), Australia (1969), the EEC
(1970), Denmark (1972), Austria (1976), Finland (1977) and Switzerland
(1978). There is one case of particular interest: Australia switched
to global tariff quota from VER import control in 1975. Those who has
interest in studying the political economics of VER can see Sung
(1988) or D.B. Yoffie (1983).
Five countries- Australia, United States, Japan, Norway, and
Canada will be taken as samples representing different kinds of states
8adopting different import policies. U.S is the country that imposes
VER for all the sampling years, Japan is another extreme that has no
quantitative restrictions. Norway.. Australia and Canada are the states
that experience switches between VER and GQ.
Data mainly comes from the Hong Kong Trade Statistics. All of
them were typed in floppy disks. The code numbers and their
corresponding item descriptions are placed in the appendix. Four
instead of six digit codes are presented because we have discarded the
first two which are the same for all clothing products- 84. As
different categorization schemes were used before and after 1978,
all the data was re-categorized according to the earlier scheme with
the help of Amendment to Trade Statistics taken from Hong Kong Trade
Statistics 1978. However, there are some items appearing in the post-
1978 scheme that were aggregated with other items in the old scheme.
For example, for those items that are made of silk which were grouped
under clothing of textile other than cotton, man-made-fiber, and
wool before 1978, it is impossible to dis-aggregate them out. We
therefore do not try to re-categorize them but just leave it
unchanged. However, we have to bear in mind the different meaning of
other textile before and after 1978.
In the following chapters, we will first discuss the differential
9impacts of VERs and GQs from a theoretical stand point. The VERs and
GQs used in the five importing countries will then be discussed.
Empirical verification of the propositions drawn from theoretical
section will be conducted in the following chapters. All the figures





This chapter is the basis for future discussion. The discussion
is divided into two parts. In the first part we will explain the main
ideas about differences of VER and GQ that will be verified in the
latter chapters, and in the second part, problems of various indexes
that we will use widely will be discussed.
Both Voluntary Export Restraint (VER) and Global quota
restriction (GQ) are types of quantitative restriction, i.e. they
limit the volume of import items. The main features of VER that
distinguishes it from GQ are: (1) VER is administered by the exporting
country but GQ importing country (2) VER is aimed at limiting sales of
particular items from specific exporting states that are considered
causing 'market disruption', but GQ will limit items from all sources
(3) VER is carried out bilaterally and have to conform to the rule of
Multifibre arrangement (MFA), but GQ is imposed unilaterally. The
above three facts are the roots of all the following differences.
In the first place, there is a question of effectiveness of
protection. It is technically more difficult for countries to control
exports than imports, especially when there is an asymmetrical
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motivation under VER. Also, the non-global nature of VER will create
loopholes for exporters to get around the restriction by shifting the
production base to other places. Sales can be augmented further by
trans-shipments through non-restricting countries. Ambiguity in
restricted items and flexibility of agreement, e.g. Allowance for
borrowing against future quotas, switching between categories and
carrying over unused quotas, also enable exporters to increase the
shipment.
First, there is a difference in distributional effects. In case of
quantitative restriction, scarcity rent will be created. Domestic
price will increase due to limited supply. Yet the rent recipient will
be different under GQ and VER. In GQ, quota licenses for import are
granted by the domestic government and distributed to local importers.
Thus, assuming perfect competition in both importing and exporting
markets, rent income will be captured by the importing country
government or importers, depending on the procedure of quota
distribution. However, in the case of VER, quotas are distributed by
the exporting country government as a compensation for 'voluntary'
reduction in export quantity. Under the competitive assumptions, rent
income will be captured by the exporting country government or
exporters, depending also on the methods of quota distribution.
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The third response under VER will be strategic sales expansion to
the importing country in unrestricted items before the conclusion of
agreement, because VER is a bilateral agreement that has to conform to
MFA regulation, which specifies that there should not have any cut-
back in volume of import allowed for those restricted items compared
to pervious shipment level. The negotiation process involved in the
bilateral agreement can give time for exporters to carry out necessary
action to increase the existing level of import. Thus strategic export
expansion will result in a larger base restriction level. The
increased base level for the items has two benefits to the exporters:
(1) The prospective market of those items will be less limited (2)
They can captured more scarcity rent due to larger amount of import
allowed. Unless the exporters expect that the future market for those
markets is gloomy due to, say, keen competition of exporters from
other countries, they will try to take the strategic action. However,
it will be meaningless to do so under threat of GQ restriction. The
most important reason is GQ is an unilateral restriction invoked by
using GATT article XIX. The only thing the importing country has to do
is non-discrimination against any exporting states with respect to
their imports. Other things including the aggregate limited level is
out of the control of the exporters.
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The fourth implication of VER is to protect the inefficient
exporters and thereby stabilizes market shares. It can be understood
if we give an example. Suppose there are two exporting states A and B
which signed bilateral agreement with importing state M in 1960. At
that time, country A and B have 20 and 10 percent shares in import
respectively. Over time, we should expect there is a change in
competitiveness in various items of the two exporting countries.
Therefore, if without the agreement, country B can export larger
volume in those items and manage to penetrate state M more than A,
resulting in a larger import share of country B. However, the base
level and growth factors specified in the agreement limit what country
B can do. This is to say, bilateral agreement under VER will protect
inefficient producers, limiting the change in market shares to reflect
comparative advantages in the exporting countries. We have to note
that this will only occur in VER but not in GQ restriction, because
under GQ, there is no specific base level of import for various
countries. Countries still have to try to export as much as they
can,as what they do under free trade.
The next possible difference can be found in product
concentration. When quotas are binding, the exporters can be thought
to have been hindered their potential capacities. So, if there are
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unrestricted products, they can simply try to produce the unrestricted
items to make more profit, causing a more diversified product
combination. This is more likely under VER than GQ because (1) it pays
to take strategic export promotion under VER to hedge against the
future possible restriction against those unrestricted items, and
(2) less competitive products will be protected under VER while they
will be phased out under GQ. However, in the case of GQ, provided that
the coverage of product restriction is wide. enough, exporting
countries will face the competition from each other, just as the case
under free trade. Exporters should specialize in the items that they
are more capable to sell in the market, resulting a situation of more
concentrated export to those market.
The final issue we want to discuss about is quality upgrading.
Although several empirical studies have shown that under quantitative
restrictions, quality upgrading will be the consequence. However, no
one has ever mentioned or compared the extent of quality upgrading in
the two cases. To the exporters under VER, because of thr protection
given to restricted items and effort to explore unrestricted items,
exporters are in fact producing a product bundle that will not be
chosen under GQ or free trade. If the exporters in a country are
relatively less competitive in lower rank products, they are in fact
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sheltered by VER. i.e. They will concentrate more in producing higher
rank products under GQ or free trade. The situation of course will
reverse if the exporting country is competitive in producing lower
rank items. However, we are not saying that under VER there is no
quality upgrading. In fact several studies have given evidence to
support this phenomenon in VER. We should however differentiate
between two different kinds of quality upgrading. Suppose there are
two items A and B, of which A is a more sophisticated item. The first
type of quality upgrading is increasing the proportion of production
in item A, and the other type is improving the quality of both items.
Due to the fact that GQ is not source-specific, the first type will
happen more noticeably in GQ. The second type will happen under both
VER and GQ.
We will later conduct empirical investigation of the above topics
except the effectiveness of the policies to restrict import level
because it is related to importing but not the exporting state. We are
now going to discuss the problems of indexes.
In the following chapters, unit value index (UVI), quantum index
(QI), and value index (VI) will be widely used to proximate changes of
average price, quantity, and value. The UVI will also be taken as an
indicator of quality upgrading. In the first place, let us examine the
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definition of them.
UVI is in fact a Laspeyres type index, i.e. a base year quantity
weighted index, while QI (which is the quotients of VI over its
corresponding UVI) is a Paasche type (current-weighted) index. UVI
according to this definition is subject to effects of: inflation,
changes in quality, import policy, product mix and market conditions
in the importing country.
Quality changes is the most obvious cause of changes in UVIs.
With higher quality and so higher price, UVI will surely increase.
While effects of inflation can be eliminated by comparing UVI to
rate of changes of clothing product price, the influence caused by
changes in product mix cannot be totally eliminated. There are many
items to be exported every year and they are not usually the same,
which will cause different result in calculating values of indexes
when we chose different base years. Our practice is to choose the
middle year of the sampling years as the base year.
Changes in policy is another important source of influence. The
change from VER to GQ restriction will tend to depress the UVI and
exports as the rent is transferred from exporters to importers.
Market conditions can influence the demand for the respective
products. Higher demand will lead to higher higher import price and
17
higher UVI, even if other factors are kept unchanged. Though some
factors of market conditions can hardly be measured, e.g. consumers'
taste, the effect due to higher income can be understood with the help
of importing state's income data. When there are change of growth rate
of income and exchange rate, we can expect impacts on import demand.
According to the above paragraphs, when we find a change in UVI,
we cannot attribute it to any quality upgrading unless we are sure
that the other factors are of minor importance in causing the change.
18
CHAPTER 3
SITUATION IN IMPORTING STATES
While detailed description of evolution of import policies in
importing countries can be found in Sung (1988), we highlight the
specification of agreements and restrictions that are relevant to our
further analysis. However, particulars will still be added in the
appropriate chapters when the need arises. Japan will not be discussed
because it has not participated in any MFA quantitative restrictions,
and represents a free market.
U.S.
The United States had previously followed a system of aggregate
control of trade in textiles and clothing prior to 1971, where
equivalent square yard of total cotton textile and clothing import is
the unit of measurement. After 1971, woolen and MMF textile and
clothing were put under specific quota control. Since then more and
more items are put under VER restriction in successive MFAs. Recently,
U.S.'s protectionist pressure is getting higher. MFA IV further sees




In pre-MFA and the beginning of MFA I (1974- 1977) periods, only
a few clothing items are subject to bilateral agreements. Towards the
end of 1976, Canada imposed GQ on fifteen categories of clothing
imports and unilaterally abrogated its bilateral agreement with Hong
Kong. It is estimated that the affected categories cover about 90% of
Canadian clothing imports from Hong Kong. The GQ was replaced by VER
starting from January 1, 1979, and a wider range of clothing items
were put under the agreement.
Australia
Australia's first restraints were imposed on a few cotton
products from Hong Kong in 1968. At the beginning of MFA I (1974),
Australia negotiated agreements with four suppliers (Hong Kong, India,
Korea, and Macao) involving application of voluntary export restraints
on a range of clothing items. In December 1974, the Australian
government imposed global tariff quotas, outside the MFA, on certain
textile and clothing items. In mid-1976, all the bilateral restriction
under MFA were replaced by tariff quotas. In 1977-78, the tariff quota
system was extended to several other textiles and clothing items,
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bring the total number of import categories covered by tariff quotas
to forty-six, which covers almost all the clothing items. From January
1982, tariff quota have been applied to an increased range of clothing
products.
Norway
Norway had also negotiated a bilateral agreement with Hong Kong
in for certain apparel products in 1962. It remained effective
throughout the LTA, with some changes in product coverage. At the
beginning of MFA II (1978), Norway negotiated bilateral agreements
with six developing countries with the intention of continuing to
participate in the MFA. Because its efforts for a satisfactory
arrangement with Hong Kong were not successful. Norway ultimately
decided against continued participation in the MFA. In July 1978
(seven months after MFA II came into effect), Norway notified that it
had decided to involve Article XIX of the GATT and to introduce GQ on
thirteen groups of clothing beginning in 1979. Such 'global' import
quotas are not really global. They do not apply to import from EFTA,
EEC, and six countries with which Norway has bilateral agreements. The
six countries are India, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri
Lanka and Thailand. The bilaterals with the first two countries
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expired at the end of 1981, and the remaining four expired at the end
of 1982. Upon the expiration of the bilateral agreements, Norway
increased its global quotas to take account of trade from these
countries. However, imports from other EFTA countries and the EEC have
throughout this period remained free of duties and quota restrictions.
From July 1, 1984 onwards, Norways abandoned its GQ restriction and
switched back to VER. The Hong Kong/Norway textile agreement, which
runs from July 1, 1984 to June 30, 1987 provides for the restraint of
fourteen specific textile and clothing items and export authorization
on seven items.
Details of the restrictions of Canada, Norway and Australia are
listed in the appendix.
In the following chapters, We will view tariff quota and GQ as
belonging the same kind of restriction in many times. The rationale
behind this is VER is source-specific while GQ and tariff quota are
not. When we consider those differences caused by this reason, we can




We have mentioned that value of UVI will be affected during the
change of policy. The proposition is that when import policy is
changed from VER to GQ, rent captured by the exporters previously will
be lost, which should reflected in reduction of unit prices of export
items. The situation will be reversed when policy is changed from the
other way round.
We will try to verify the above statement by use of UVI data. The
UVI represents unit price of HK's non-fur clothing export to various
countries. The reason to choose non-fur clothing but not all the
clothing items is that restriction agreement seldom include fur
clothing. However, as what we have explained in the earlier chapter,
we have to eliminate other factors' influence. We will make use of
consumer price index to gain knowledge of inflation. Three types of
indices are obtained, Consumer price index A, B( CPI(A), CPI(B)) and
Hang Seng Consumer Price Index (HSCPI) for clothing and footwear. For
purpose of more convenient comparison, deflated UVI (DUVI) will be
calculated by subtracting average growth of the three price indices
from UVI. Exchange rates and growth rates of GNP in various countries
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are employed to shed light on domestic demand of the importing
country. If we find a reduction in UVI noticeably which cannot be
attributed to the influence of inflation or domestic demand, we can
conclude that the reduction comes from the policy change.
We have to notice one thing more. Under VER, exporters are able
to capture the scarcity rent only if the quota utilization rates be
high enough. We will inspect this aspect in different countries first.
Quota utilizations of clothing to Canada are generally high both
before and after the GQ period. Most of the items exceed 90%
utilization rates, some of them even exceed 100%. We therefore expect
rent revenue to exist in the VER periods. Situation to Australia is
comparable. Only two items out of six are of utilization rates less
than 90%. However, although utilization rates to Norway before GQ
period is high, they are not so after GQ period, four out of fourteen
items are of utilization rates exceed 60%, but nine of them are below
50%. Therefore, rent receipt after GQ period to Norway market may not
be significant. Now, let us begin our analysis. In the following,
exchange rates represent the amount of Hong Kong dollars per unit of
foreign currency.
In Norway, changes in GNP in 1977 and 1978 are similar (4.54% and
5.07%), which means that income effect should pay a minor role in
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affecting the composition. However, the growth rate of DUVI of non-fur
clothing exported to Norway decreases from 8.03% in 1977 to 2.53% in
1978. Therefore, the noticeable drop in DUVI growth should be due to
the loss of rent during policy change, since it is quite unlikely that
quality decreases suddenly within a year when there is no sign of
decrease in domestic demand. Although the change of DUVI from 1983 to
1984 is not significant (from 9.98% to 9.55%), it may be due to the
low utilization rate of quotas in 1984 (The utilization rates vary
from 27.3% to 66.8%).
In Canada, situation is similar. We can also observe a decrease
in growth of DUVI from 13.22% in 1976 to 2.41% in 1977, and a increase
from 5.65% to 23.25% when import policies are switched between VER and
GQ. Although the growth rate of GNP did reduce from 6.15% to 3.58% and
Canadian dollar appreciated from 4.63 to 4.22 in this period, the
magnitude of reduction is not high and so we believe the main source
of influence to UVI comes from different captured.
In Australia, noticeable drop in growth of DUVI is observed from
12.68% in 1976 to -7.95% in 1977, which may reflect the aspect of
different rent captured, though it can be caused by reduce in domestic
demand (growth in Australia from 1976 to 1977 decreases from 2.7% to
0.86%) and the appreciation of Australian dollars (exchange rate
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changes from 5.07 to 5.28).
Overall speaking, the evidence shown in the three markets is
consistent with our proposition. However, we should say the use of
consumer price index of clothing and footwear is commensurable with
our UVI indices which excludes fur clothing and footwear. However, as
the share of fur clothing and footwear in total consumption is small,
our results are not greatly biased.
Table 4.1 Performance against quota limits- garments to Canada
11/75- 10/76
% Utilization Item




88.56 Structured suits, men's and boys'
99.87 Shirts, men's and boys', with tailored collars
89.75 Blouses and shirts, women's and girls'
80.74 Sweaters, pullovers
79.51 Shirts, men's and boys', other than with collars
124.38 T-shirts and sweatshirts
105.00 Shirts, blouses, infants
89.86 Trousers, men's and boys'
97.09 Trousers, women's and girls'
61.92 Overalls and coveralls
93.08 Dresses and skirts
88.68 Suits, women's and girls'
178.46 Children's wear other than shirts
104.97 Underwear
105.69 Shorts
3.73 Unstructured suits, men's and boys'
72.96 Jackets








Source: Trade Department Annual Report, 1976, 1984
Table 4.2 Performance against cruota limits- Garment to Australia
from May 75 to June 76
% Utilization Items
107.38 Shirts, Jackets
74.09 Dresses, women's and girls'
86.74 Trousers, men's and boys'
99.62 Coats, women's, girls' and infants'
109.13
Blouses, women's and girls'90.87 Nightwear, women's, girls' and infants'
Performance against quota limits- Garment to Norway
1/77- 12/77 7/84- 12/84
% Utilization % Utilization Item
101.95 66.79 Woven jacket
105.45 66.01 Woven slacks
102.50 38.67 Woven dresses
85.14 Woven skirts
108.02 61.41 Woven blouses, women's and girls'
74.75 Woven nightgarments, women's and girls'
43.61 Neckties
104.45 60.59 Woven shirts, men's and boys'
49.69 Woven shirts, girls' and women's
82.85 36.23 Knitted stockings
105.33 Knitted briefs, drawers
87.17 44.99 Knitted nightgarment
106.78 Knitted jacket, of wool or acrylic fiber
77.02 34.48 Knitted shirts






Source: Trade Department Annual Report, various issues
Table 4.3 GNP values in various countries
Constant price at 1981 Constant price at 1979
Canada Australia
GNP % Growth GNP% Growth
1975 281192 1975 109574
1976 298483 6.15 1976 112535 2.70
1977 309166 3.58 1977 113508 0.86
1978 323307 4.57 1978 119327 5.13
3359071979 3.90 1213491979 1.69
1980 340878 1.48 1980 124791 2.84
1981 353454 1274473.69 1981 2.13
-3.34 -0.97341661 1262091982 1982
1983 132740 5.171983 352417 3.15
1984 139416 5.03372132 5.591984
1985 145280 4.21386822 3.951985














Source: National Accounts Statistics: Main Aggregates
and detailed Tables, 1985, United Nations.
Table 4.4 Wholesale price index of Clothirxa and footwear (1974- 19A6)
CPI (A) HSCPICPI (B) Avg Growth
% Growth % Growth % Growth
1974 101.3 101 95.8
-3.26
-3.271975 -0.4298 -2.3197.7 95.4
-0.10
-0.101976 97.9 97.6 98.2 2.94 0.91
1977 100.8 2.96 100.3 2.77 101.5 3.36 3.03
1978 103.3 2.48 102.3 1.99 104.8 3.25 2.58
1979 110 6.49 108.5 6.06 111.8 6.68 6.41
1980 121.1 10.09 119.3 9.95 122.8 9.84 9.96
1980 107.5 107.3 107.4
1981 114.7 6.70 114.6 6.80 108.7 1.21 4.90
1982 129.7 13.08 130 13.44 116.9 7.54 11.35
1983 140.3 8.17 141.2 8.62 120.7 3.25 6.68
1984 155.9 11.12 156.9 11.12 137 13.50 11.91
1985 169 8.40 171 8.99 146.7 7.08 8.16
1986 178.8 5.80 183.2 7.13 155 5.66 6.20
Source: Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics, 1981, 1988
Table 4.5 Exchange Rates (HK dollar per unit of foreign currency)
US Japans( Canadian i Australian
dollar dollar dollaryen
1971 5.710 0.018 5.680 6.800
1972 5.694 0.019 5.730 7.280
0.0181973 5.090 5.120 7.580
4.910 0.016 4.970 6.5001974
0.017 4.9601975 5.035 6.320
0.016 4.630 5.0704.6731976











Source: Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics
Table 4.6 Growth rates of UVI of HK's clothing export
Hong Kong's clothing exportHong Kong's clothing export

















Table 4.7 Hong Kong's clothing export



















In this chapter, we compare the GQ and VER in respect to their
influences on exporting state's strategic response. We know that under
VER there has an incentive for exporters to increase its shipment
level of unrestricted items when those items are going to be
restricted which will not be seen under GQ, as we have explained in
the earlier chapter.
We will take four countries, U.S., Norway, Canada, and Australia
to verify our proposition. We will compare the growth rate of UVI to
that of QI, If QI's growth rates were rapid while that of UVI's were
low or negative in successive years, we suspect that strategic export
promotion has occurred. Their individual condition will be inspected
one by one.
1. Case of the U.S.
Now, we take the U.S. as an example to illustrate how promotion
strategy has occurred under VER. The U.S. government was pushed to
'take the necessary steps' by sending Secretary of Commerce Maurice
Stans to Europe and the Far East to arrange a new international
conference on multifiber textiles early in 1968, when the domestic
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producers felt the competition in synthetic and wool fiber clothing.
However, all he could get is un-enthusiastic responses. Then, between
March 1970 and April 1971, negotiations with Japan and the other East
Asian exporters went through several rounds, but all ended in failure.
Finally, under the threat of imminent unilateral restriction, Hong
Kong officials agree to draft a VER in September 1971 to restraint its
exports of man-made fiber and wool textile products with effect from
October 1, 1971.
We suspect that during the consultation period: 1970 to 1971, the
exporters in Hong Kong had managed to shipped as much as possible to
raise the base for the new quota.Referring to table 5.1a, we can see
the increasing trend of uantum and Value index of MMF clothing to the
U.S. market during 1968 to°1971. However, we cannot simply assert that
Hong Kong exporters had adopted strategic action just by looking at
the data, because the trend can be caused by increased demand in the
U.S. At least, the slight rise in Unit Value Index may reflect this
possibility. Additionally, we find that the growth of Quantum index
for wool fiber clothing was negative (See table 5.1b). Therefore, we
are left to choose between (1) export promotion occurred only in MMF
products and (2) Aggregation of products conceal the true situation.
lBecause export promotion may happen in some items but not in o .hers,
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i.e. there are noticeable increase in QI for some for not for others,
while the overall QIs can exhibit little change.
To tackle the problem of aggregation, we disaggregate clothing
into five groups representing the most outstanding clothing products
in export markets- Trousers, Sweaters, Shirts, Coats and suits, and
Blouses. Due to difficulties in finding exact correspondence in trade
statistics, we will use the following categorization instead: (i)
Slacks, shorts and trousers (ii) Knitted jackets, sweaters and
pullovers (iii) Shirts and dress shirts (iv) Knitted suits and coats,
(v) not knitted suits, coats and jackets, and (vi) Blouses. The reason
for calculating the indexes of these products is: It is reasonable for
the exporters to promote the products which have already established
their positions in foreign markets, and of which they have the
comparative advantage to produce, especially when the top three items
have represented almost half of total clothing export in early 70s
(According to Hong Kong Trade Review, 1974). The export performance of
the above five items are analysed below, one by one according to their
importance in export level.
Slacks, shorts and trousers (table 5.2a): The QI for MMF has
increased from 9.44 to 100 from 1968 to 1971, with an average growth
rate of 80.4% per year, while UVI only grow from 67.93 to 100, with an
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average growth rate of only 10.2%. The performance in wool fiber
clothing deserve more attention. While the QI of it increases from
23.3 to 100 from 1968 to 1971, with average growth rate 43.9%, the UVI
effectively decrease, from 104.22 to 100 in the same period. Moreover,
both of them have shown a decrease in UVI and increase in QI in 1970.
The growth in QIs are more than 150% while the decrease in UVIs are 4
and 14% respectively, indicating that exporters were promoting exports
as much as possible for their top item!
Sweaters (Table 5.2b): Because of the difficulty mentioned
earlier, the table actually represent the group of 'Knitted jacket,
twinsets, sweaters, cardigans and pullovers'. QI of MMF has not shown
to be significantly surged, neither does UVI. Moreover, although the
quantity of wool products seems to be increased more compared to its
unit value in 1969, which is a possible consequence of strategic
action, the average performance of this group cannot be said in a firm
manner to be the target of export promotion. The analysis, however,
may be affected by the inexact classification.
Shirts and Dress shirts (Table 5.2c): While the record of MMF is
not worthy of notice for this item (increase in QI accompanying by
increase in UVI at similar pace), the situation for wool is different.
There is an obvious growth in QI (143%) and a decrease in UVI (3.6%)
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in 1970, indicating strategic export promotion.
Suits and coats (Table 5.2d (1), (2)): The table (1) denotes the
knitted products, while table (2) represents in addition not knitted
jackets aside from suits and coats. For knitted suits and coats, QI of
MMF not only increase from 9.41 to 100 from 1968 to 1971, growing on
average 80.6% per annum, the UVI has also shown to be decreased in
1970 (-2.57%), in contrast to the noticeable increase of QI in this
year (133.56%). The situation in wool products are similar but
somewhat more drastic, the QI and UVI are 210.4 and 2.3 in 1970,
denoting a change of 102% and -68% respectively! For not knitted
items, both MMF and wool have also shown the simultaneous increase in
QI and decrease in UVI in 1969, wool fiber items even carry this trend
on to 1970 and 1971.
Blouses (Table 5.2e): There are increase in QI and decrease in
UVI in 1969 for MMF items (174.75% and -5.85%). The noticeable
increase in QI compared to that of UVI (160.05% and 18.99%) in 1971
also deserves attention. In addition, QI of wool products grow far
more quickly than UVI among 1969 and 1970.
The above discussion can be summarized in a few statements: The
phenomenon of large increase in QI and decrease (or only slightly
increase) in-UVI is found in almost all major export items that are
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made,of MMF or wool during 1969 to 1971. There are strong indications
/Of strategic action adopted by Hong Kong's exporters to penetrate the
market.
2. Case of Norway
We are going to examine the situation under GQ. The first example
is Norway's case. Norway began negotiating a bilateral agreement with
Hong Kong for certain apparel products in 1962. In late 1977, Norway
demanded Hong Kong to reduce the restraint level below the 1976 trade
level, in almost 40%. Hong Kong refused to accept this agreement. In
July 1978, Norway notified that it would invoke Article XIX to take
unilateral action to impose GQ.
After knowing the background, we are going to examine the export
performance for those major items which were not listed in bilateral
agreement between Hong Kong and Norway in 1977. They are 'Knitted
slacks, shorts and trousers', 'Woven nightwear for men', 'Raincoats',
'Swimsuits', 'Underwears' and 'Gloves'. We will follow the similar
analysis earlier.
When we scan through the tables 5.3a to 5.3f, we can see almost
all the products (except swimsuits and gloves) exhibit decrease in QIs
in 1977 and 1978, among which UVIs of 'Woven nightgarments for men'
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and 'Undergarments' are even increasing in 1977. For swimsuits and
gloves, the increase in QIs are accompanied by increase in UVIs, so it
should not be an action of strategic promotion. All in all, there is-
no sign of increased shipment before the enforcement of import quota.
3. Case of Australia
The second example to illustrate the situation under GQ is
Australia. At the beginning of MFA I (1974), Australia negotiated
agreements with Hong Kong on a range of clothing items. In December
1974, the Australia government imposed global 'tariff quotas' on
certain textiles. In 1975, more clothing items were taken in the
system. The system involves a two-tier tariff: the 'base tariff
applies to imports up to a specified level and is expressed in ad
valorem terms. Imports above the base level are subjected to
additional specific duty, expressed in dollars per unit. The penalty
duties have usually been very high, so the system has tended to be
equivalent to that achieved by global quotas. In mid-1976, all
bilateral restrictions under the MFA were replaced by tariff quotas.
To see whether there has strategic import promotion before the
enforcement of tariff quota, we follow the same procedure to find out
those major unrestricted products in the bilateral agreement. They are
'Knitted suits and coats', 'Woven shirts', 'Nightwears for men and
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boy', 'Knitted nightwear for women and girls', 'Underwears' and
'gloves'. Various indexes are shown in table 5.4a to 5.4f. As we
examine the tables, there are no strong evidence of increased shipment
before agreement for all the products, conforming to our prediction
also.
4. Case of Canada
Due to the breaking of computer which stored trade statistics in
1976, Canada could not keep an eye on the import level. When the
computer restored its function, Canada discovered that the import
level was so high that it could not take restrictive measures under
the MFA to meet the demands of domestic industry. In November 1976,
Canada invoked Article XIX and announced GQ restriction.
Also, when we glace through the tables which contains the non-
restricted items..before the introduction of GQ, there is no one table
which exhibits enormous increase in quantity export compared to that
in unit value, which is a necessary phenomenon when strategic action
has been adopted.
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5. Re-consideration of U.S's case
Like wool and MMF before 1971, silk and other vegetable fiber
apparels were not subject to agreement control before 1986. According
to our above analysis, we may suspect that there should have been
strategic export promotion before 1986. Since only silk products were
separated from items that are made of 'other materials other than
cotton, wool, and MMF' since 1978, apparel of other materials
including vegetable fiber were still be grouped together. We can
therefore analyse the case of silk only. Let's take a look at the
performances of indices of silk clothing (Table 5.5). We found that
although the quantum index growth dramatically in 1983 and 1984, they
are accompanied by increased unit values at the same period. Moreover,
the QI even decrease in 1985 substantially, which should not have
happened.
We suspect maybe the a strategic action only occur in a few
items, which be the same case in wool products. However, when we
glance through the tables (5.5a- 5.5f), we still cannot find support
on strategic promotion in any silk products. Is it the case that our
proposition is wrong?
In fact, there are some factors that have affected the optimality
of such action. i.e. The export promotion is no longer the most
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optimal strategy. The first is the rising protectionist's pressure in
the U.S. There are threat of anti-dumping actions, together with stiff
competition from neighboring low-cost producing countries, making it
un-justify to 'dump' beforehand. Second, the open door trade policy of
China has attracted many garment manufacturers to invest there, in
which they can enjoy the advantages of considerably low labour cost
and higher quota amount for China's export to the U.S. For production
of silk apparel. This can be supported by the figures: QIs of silk
clothing before 1984 grow considerably, but begin to drop after then.
This coincides in the rise of the investment of Hong Kong's
manufacturers in China to make use of cheap labour there.
We note that although it is possible for Hong Kong to shift their
production of MNF products to other states like Thailand, Sri Lanka in
70s to get around the restriction aimed at limiting Hong Kong's import
(indeed some garment producers did so like Law's garment), it cannot
be a very optimal action at that time. There are other considerations,
such as the transportation cost and cultural differences, that make
the shifting of the production base costly. Unlike the situation in
70s, China is close to Hong Kong, both in location and in culture, and
Hong Kong manufacturers shift their labour-intensive process to China
36
on a large scale in the mid eighties.
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6. Conclusion
In fact there are no rule of thumb in adopting strategy. The one
that can achieve the fundamental proposition of profit maximization is
the best one. However, when we note the response of exporting firms to
VER, there are mainly two types of responses. One is strategic dumping
and the other shifting of production base. Both of them lead to
expansion of export in face of VER. Therefore, the difference we have
mentioned is not a strict one. VER is thus less effective than GQ in
restricting imports.
Table 5.1 MMF and Woolen clothing Export to the U.S.-
(Figures in the parentheses represent rates of growth)
(a) Man-made-fibre clothing
Unit Value Index Quantum Index Value Index- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1958 79.84 36.90 29.46
1969 83.48( 4.56) 54.69( 48.21) 45.65( 54.97)
1970 88.65( 6.19) 77.56( 41.83) 68.75( 50.61)
1971 100.00( 12.80) 100.00( 28.94) 100.00( 45.45)
1972 129.60( 29.60) 99.11( -0.89)76.47(-23.53)
1973 94.36( -4.79)163.41( 26.08) 57.74(-24.49)
162.49( -0.56) 57.27( -0.82)1974 93.06( -1.38)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b) Woolen clothing
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Unit Value Index Quantum Index Value Index
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - -
1968 79.16 122.21 96.74
78.55( -0.77)1969 153.34( 25.48) 120.45( 24.51)
71.96( -8.39) 142.47( -7.09)1970 102.52(-14.88)
100.00( -2.46)1971 100.00( 38.96) 100.00(-29.81)
1972 125.29( 25.29) 56.58(-43.42) 70.89(-29.11)
1973 135.55( 8.19) 42.75(-24.45) 57.95(-18.26)
42.63( -0.28)1974 136.21( 0.49) 58.07( 0.21)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Table 5.2 Selected Clothing Items exported to the U. S.
(Figures in the parentheses represent rates of growth)
(a) Slacks , shorts and trousers
Cotton Man-made-fibre Wool
UVI QI VI UVI QI VI UVI QI VI
1986 8027 83.33 66.89 67.93 9.44 6.41 104.22 23.30 24.29
1969 89.42 76.44 68.36 94.52 17.91 16.93 113.7443.74 49.75
11.39 8.26 2.19 39.15 89.79 164.09 9.13 87.70 104.84
1970 89.92 71.04 63.88 90.70 45.38 41.16 97.68 109.50 106.96
0.56 7.07 6.56 4.05 153.39 143.13 14.12 150.35 115.01
1971 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
11.21 40.77 56.56 10.26 120.36 142.97 2.37 8.38 6.51
1972 141.63 97.53 138.13 104.92 71.50 75.02 169 .48 35.94 60.91
41.63 2.47 38.13
4.92 28.50 24.98 69.48 64.06 39.09
1973 176.81 81.11 134.41 137.12 42.06 57.67 174.70 46.18 80.69
24.84 16.84 3.82 30.68 41.18 23.14 3.08 58.50 32.46
(b)Jackets, twinsets, sweaters, cardigans and pullovers, knitted
Cotton Mna-made-fibre Wool
UVI QI VI UVI QI VI UVI QI VI
1968 64.50 70.86 45.70 86.15 66.55 57.33 96.52 127.93 123.48
1969 97.48 36.20 35.29 77.97 81.30 63.39 96.73 141.94 137.29
54.14 48.91 22.77 9.50 22.16 10.55 0.21 10.95 11.18
1970 107.02 23.94 25.62 86.92 67.07 58.30 98.62 105.55 104.10
9.79 33.87 27.40 11.48 17.50 8.03 1.96 25.63 24.17
1971 100.00 100.00 100.00
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
6.56 317.70 290.29 15.05 49.09 71.54 1.40 5.26 3.94
1972 126.33 246.37 311.25 113.34 132.68 150.38 118.30 82.42 97.51
26.33 146.37 211.25 13.34 32.68 50.38 18.30 17.58 2.49
1973 111.61 573.29 639.82 116.57 153.03 178.38 135.54 64.28 87.12
11.66 132.69 105.56 2.85 15.33 18.62 14.56 22.01 10.65
(C) Shirts and dress shirts
Cotton Man-made-fibre Wool
UVI QI VI UVI QI VI UVI QI VI
1968 69.83 101.92 71.17 82.29 60.29 49.97 68.7 85.34 58.64
1969 75.56 88.15 66.61 85.80 79.27 68.01
87.45 74.85 65.46
8.20 13.51 6.42 4.26 30.55 36.11 27.27 12.29 11.62
1970 86.95 77.72 67.58 98.96 86.81 85.91 84.31181.99 153.43
15.07 11.83 1.46 15.34 9.51 26.31 3.59 143.14 134.40
1971 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
15.01 28.66 47.98 1.05 15.20 16.40 18.61 45.05 34.82
1972 117.05 104.30 122.08 121.50 47.58 57.81
117.19 33.74 39.54
17.05 4.30 22.08 21.50 52.55 42.19 17.19 66.26 60.46
1973 155.64 126.58 197.00 180.50 33.98 61.33 95.90 37.89 36.34
32.97 21.36 61.36 48.56 28.59 6.08 18.16 12.30 8.09
(d1) suits and coats knitted
Cotton Man-made fibre Wool
UVI QI VI UVI QI VI UVI QI VI
1968
90.16 40.04 36.10 66.59 9.14 6.26
6.26 73.34 4.59
1969 118.02 30.77 36.31 66.99 16.89 11.32 7.19 104.15 7.49
30.89 23.15 0.59 0.61 79.58 80.67 14.81 42.01 63.04
1970 102.76 45.79 47.05 65.27 39.46 25.75
2.30 210.39 4.84
12.93 48.80 29.57 2.57 133.56 127.56
68.02 102.0035.40
1971 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
100.00 100.00 100.00
2.69 118.41 112.53 53.22 153.42 288.29 4248.85 52.47 1967.05
1972 187.61 77.68 145.73 136.65 72.17 98.62 115.82 43.20 50.03
87.61 22.32 45.73
36.65 27.83 1.38 15.82 56.80 49.97
1973 207.29 125.93 261.04 157.08 47.69 74.91
125.11 20.29 25.39
10.49 62.12 79.12 14.95 33.92 24.04 8.02 53.03 49.26
(d2) Suits, coats and jackets, not knitted
Cotton Man-made-fibre Wool
UVI VIQI UVI VI UVIQI VIQI
1968 65.58 85.71 56.21 67.67 23.71 16.04 233.94 29.14 68.18
1969 85.00 98.42 83.66 58.79 53.05 31.19 202.45 54.86 111.06
( 29.61)( 14.84)( 48.85) (-13.12)(123.75)( 94.40) (-13.46)( 88.24)( 62.90)
1970 92.75 131.35 121.82 68.53 85.36 58.49 145.91 87.12 127.11
( 9.11)( 33.46)( 45.62) ( 16.56)( 60.90)( 87.54) (-27.93)( 58.80)( 14.45)
1971 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
( 7.82)(-23.87)(-17.91) ( 45.93)( 17.16)( 70.97) (-31.46)( 14.79)(-21.33)
1972 99.05 183.63 181.88 145.35 80.25 116.65 147.96 13.14 19.44
( -0.95)( 83.63)( 81.88) ( 45.35)(-19.75)( 16.65) ( 47.96)(-86.86)(-80.56)
1973, 113.75 240.77 273.88 158.16 91.33 144.46 166.06 26.31 43.69
( 14.85)( 31.12)( 50.58) ( 8.81)( 13.81)( 23.84) ( 12.24)(100.31)(124.82)
(e) Blouses
Cotton Man-made-fibre Wool
UVI QI VI WI VI UVI VIQI QI
79.99 15.13 12.10 83.651968 52.88 137.91 72.93 7.69 6.43
75.31 41.56 31.301969 67.30 91.00 61.24 97.30 19.92 19.39
( 5.85)(174.75)(158.67) ( 16.31)(159.04)(201.30)( 27.27)(-34.01)(-16.02)
89.61 108.09 96.86 114.79 108.29 124.301970 89.41 94.43 84.43
( 17.97)(443.52)(541.22)( 18.99)(160.05)(209.44)( 32.85)( 3.77)( 37.86)
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.001971 100.00 100.00 100.00
(-12.88)( -7.66)(-19.55)( 11.59)( -7.48)( 3.25)( 11.84)( 5.89)( 18.44)
86.98 259.85 226.01159.30 63.03 100.411972 164.20 130.04 213.53
( 59.30)(-36.97)( 0.41) (-13.02)(159.85)(126.01)64.20)( 30.04) (113.53)
90.29 191.80 173.18211.05 53.03 111.931973 166.55 146.57 244.11
( 32.49)(-15.86)( 11.47) ( 3.81) (-26.19) (-23.37)( 1.43)( 12.71)( 14.32)
Table 5.3 Selected Clothing Items exported to Norway
(a) Trousers and shorts for men
Unit Value Index Quantum Index Value Index
1975 84.29 140.10 118.08
1976 95.83( 13.69) 152.87( 9.11) 146.49( 24.05)
1977 104.78( 9.34) 193.31( 26.46) 202.55( 38.27)100.00( -4.56)1978 100.00(-48.27) 100.00(-50.63)
1979 113.07( 13.07) 136.61( 36.61) 154.46( 54.46)
1980 131.31( 16.14) 118.97(-12.92) 156.22( 1.14)
(b) Nightgarments, men's, not knitted
Unit Value Index Quantum Index Value Index
1975 88.36 193.36 170.84
1976 94.56( 7.02) 196.26( 1.50) 185.59( 8.63
1977 97.01( 2.59) 152.79(-22.15) 148.22(-20.14)
1978 100.00( 3.08) 100.00(-34.55) 100.00(-32.53)
1979 131.96( 31.96) 123.96( 23.96) 163.59( 63.59)
1980 137.18( 3.95) 154.54( 24.66) 211.99( 29.59)
(c) Raincoats
Unit Value Index Quantum Index Value Index
1975 84.64 74.46 63.03
1976 71.34(-15.71) 343.42(361.19) 244.99(288.72)71.11( -0.33)1977 298.48(-13.09) 212.23(-13.37)
1978 100.00( 40.63) 100.00(-66.50) 100.00(-52.88)95.52( -4.48)1979 212.88(112.88) 203.35(103.35)
1980 126.21( 32.12) 138.15(-35.10) 174.36(-14.25)
(d) Swimsuit
Unit Value Index Quantum Index Value Index
1975 91.66 78.12 71.6090.35( -1.43)1976 119.59( 53.10) 108.05( 50.90)
1977 96.90( 7.25) 204.91( 71.34) 198.56( 83.77)
1978 100.00( 3.20) 100.00(-51.20) 100.00(-49.64)
1979 106.42( 6.42) 106.99( 6.99) 113.86( 13.86)
1980 121.39( 14.06) 131.23( 22.66) 159.30( 39.91)
(e) Undergarments
Value IndexQuantum IndexUnit Value Index
144.43153.7793.931975
92.32( -1.71) 229.62( 49.33) 212.00( 46.78)1976
219.43( 3.50)201.73(-12.15)1977 108.77( 17.82)
100.00( -8.07) 100.00(-54.43)100.00(-50.43)1978
156.43( 56.43)142.89( 42.89)109.48( 9.48)1979
182.84( 16.89)149.50( 4.62)122.31( 11.72)1980
(f) Gloves
Value IndexQuantum IndexUnit Value Index
100.5598.261975 102.33 92.40( -8.10)
84.03(-14.48)109.97( 7.46)1976 132.87( 43.80)118.83( 41.42)111.82( 1.68)1977 100.00(-24.74)100.00(-15.85)1978 100.00(-10.57) 99.18( -0.82)
77.42(-22.58)128.12( 28.12)1979 125.24( 26.27)80.39( 3.83)155.80( 21.61)1980
Table 5.4 Selected Clothing Items exported to Australia
(a) Suits and coats, knitted
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Unit Value Index Value IndexQuantum Index
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
85.091974 151.74 129.11
1975 94.77( 11.39) 114.40(-24.61) 108.42(-16.03)
100.00( -7.77)1976 100.00( 5.51) 100.00(-12.59)
1977 101.75( 1.75) 50.49(-49.51) 51.37(-48.63)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b) Shirts and dress shirts, not knitted
Value IndexQuantum IndexUnit Value Index




96.31( -3.69) 127.35( 27.35)132.23( 32.23)1977
(c) Nightgarments, men's
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Value IndexQuantum IndexUnit Value Index
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
316.17389.0381.271974
80.35( -1.13) 74.31(-76.50)92.48(-76.23)1975
100.00( 34.58)100.00( 8.14)100.00( 24.45)1976
115.73( 15.73)80.03(-19.97)144.60( 44.60)1977
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(d) Nightgarments, women's, xnittea




91.28( -8.72) 102.81( 2.81)112.62( 12.62)1977
(e) Undergarments
Unit Value Index Quantum Index Value Index- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1974 135.32 39.17 53.00
1975 95.18(-29.66) 39.71( 1.39) 37.80(-28.68)
1976 100.00( 5.06) 100.00(151.83) 100.00(164.57)
1977 116.39( 16.39) 131.34( 31.34) 152.87( 52.87)
(f) Gloves
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Unit Value Index Quantum Index Value Index
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -
1974 147.39 92.27 135.99
1975 112.60(-23.60) 57.21(-38.00) 64.42(-52.63)
1976 100.00(-11.19) 100.00( 74.80) 100.00( 55.24)
97.24( -2.76)1977 111.00( 11.00) 107.93( 7.93)- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Table 5.5 Selected Clothing Items exported to Canada
(a)Jakets, twinsets, sweaters, cardigans and pullovers, knitted
Unit Value Index Quantum Index Value Index
1974 96.85 36.95 35.79
:( -4.14)1975 92.84 61.58 57.17 59.74)
1976 100.00 7.72) 100.001 66.65 62.39 100.00)( 74.92)
-31.341977 111.31( 11.31) 68.661 76.42 (-23.58)
1978 121.89( 9.50) 49.591 -27.78 60.44 (-20. 91)
-9.391979 153.17 25.67) 44.931 68.82( 13.87)
(b) Suits and coats, knitted
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Unit Value Index Quantum Index Value Index
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1974 92.82 35.41 ri 32.87
1975 98.07 7( 5.66) 64.17 .7( 81.23 62.94 4( 91.49)
1976 100.00 0( 1.97) 100.00 10( 55.83 100.00 0( 58.89)
1977 105.07 7( 5.07) 59.26 6 (-40 .74) 62.27 7(-37.73)
1978 112.55 5( 7.12) 31.52 1'2 (-46 .82) 35.47 7(-43.04)
17( -0.47)1979 130.21 1( 15.69) 31.37 40.84 4( 15.15)
(c) Suits, coats and jackets, not knitted
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Unit Value Index Value IndexQuantum Index
1974 68.77 47.63 32.76
1975 89.64( 30.35) 54.80( 67.30)61.13( 28.34)
1976 100.00( 11.55) 100.00( 63.58) 100.00( 82.48)
1977 151.06( 51.06) 31.87(-68.13) 48.14(-51.86)
128.99(-14.61)1978 15.96(-49.93) 20.58(-57.25)
1979 167.35( 29.74) 39.19( 90.42)23.42( 46.77)
(d) Slaks, shorts and trousers
Value IndexUnit Value Index Quantum Index
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
16.7924.0569.811974
39.74(136.72)40.34( 67.77)98.50( 41.10)1975
100.00(151.65)100.00( 1.52)1976 LOU .00 (147.88)
95.14( -4.86) 41.61(-58.39)43.73(-56.27)1977
55.04( 32.28)54.26( 24.07)101.44( 6.62)1978
46.89(-14.80)35.81(-34.00)130.94( 29.09)1979
(e) Shirts and dress shirts
Unit Value Index Quantum Index Value Index
1974 76.21 52.26 39.83
1975 80.02( 4.99) 61.98( 18.60) 49.60( 24.52)1976 100.00( 24.98) 100.00( 61.33) 100.00(101.63)
1977 109.38( 9.38) 70.90(-29.10) 77.55(-22.45)
1978 69.12( -2.51)114.48( 4.66) 79.12( 2.03)1979 145.04( 26.70) 61.14(-11.54) 88.68( 12.08)
(f) Blouses
Unit Value Index Quantum Index Value Index
1974 85.38 70.43 60.13
1975 89.62( 4.97) 95.97( 36.26) 86.01( 43.03)
1976 100.00( 11.58) 100.00( 4.20) 100.00( 16.27)
1977 79.69(-20.31) 159.20( 59.20) 126.86( 26.86)
1978 85.21( 6.93) 207.84( 30.55) 177.11( 39.60)
1979 125.41( 47.17) 144.03(-30.70) 180.63( 1.99)
(g) Dress and skirts
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Unit Value Index Quantum Index Value Index
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1974 127.55 14.57 18.58
1975 87.38(-31.49) 59.48(308.28) 51.97(179.70)
1976 100.00( 14.44) 100.00( 68.14) 100.00( 92.41)
1977 107.68( 7.68) 66.40(-33.60) 71.50(-28.50)
1978 135.48( 25.82) 57.23(-13.81) 77.54( 8.45)
56.21( -1.79)1979 152.37( 12.47) 85.65( 10.46)
Table 5.6 Silk Clothing Export to the U.S.-
(Figures in parentheses represent rates of growth)
Unit Value Index Quantum Index Value Index
1981 63.71 54.98 35.02
-1.70)1982 69.09( 8.45) 54.04 37.34 4( 6.61)
1983 80.41 L( 16.39) 93.13 3( 72.33) 74.89 9(100.57)
1984 100.00)( 24.35) 100.00)( 7.37) 100.00 D( 33.52)
1985 106.61 L( 6.61) 66.92 ?(-33.08) 71.34 4(-28.66)
1986 113.45 5( 6.42) 77.90)( 16.40) 88.37 7( 23.87)
1987 129.50)( 14.15) 80.54 1( 3.39) 104.30 D( 18.02)
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CHAPTER 6
STABILITY OF MAPKET SHARE
Next, we are going to see the influence of different policies on
relative shares in the importing market. We have predicted that there
is a protective effect for high cost producers which have signed
bilateral agreements with importing state under the VER regime, but
not under GQ. We will examine the situations of five countries to see
the validity of this proposition.
First, let us take a look on the situation in Hong Kong. As what
we have mentioned above, if Hong Kong is not competitive enough among
the restrained countries, VER may in fact provide a shelter for Hong
Kong's less competitive products, so that the import shares of such
products under VER will actually higher than those under GQ or free
trade. We suspect that Hong Kong is less competitive in its lower rank
products due to its higher labour cost compared to its competitiors.
We will verify this proposition by figures of shares in various
markets. Before we start, we want to explain our approach.
We note that values of shares can be affected mainly by (1)
Competitiveness of products (2) Import policies of the importing
countries. Since competitiveness in different markets differs with one
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another to a certain extent (even for homogeneous products, different
cost of transportation can cause the difference), it is inappropriate
to compare the magnitude of shares across different markets. We would
rather compare the values of shares within each country when it change
import policy from VER to GQ. It is unlikely that the change of
comparative advantage be large during the change, we can therefore
observe the effect of different import policies upon the shares.
According to our proposition in the above paragraph, we predict that
import shares of Hong Kong's garment in various countries will drop
when they change the policies from VER to GQ, and the drop will be
particularly sharp for lower rank products.
In Australia (Table 3.1), after it announced the policy of tariff
quota in 1976, Hong Kong's share dropped in successive three years
from 32.2% to 23%, with average decrease rate 10% every year, which
cannot be found in other countries during the period except Norway in
1978, which is the first year of its introduction of global quota.
Actually, the process in Australia has begun after 1974, in which some
clothing items have been put under tariff quota control. We claim that
the reduction in shay---e-somewhat represent the process of adjustment to
reflect the, competitiveness of various countries in the market. The
increased shares of some developing states in Asia, e.g. Philippines,
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China and South Korea in the same period can support this claim.
In Norway (Table 3.2), Hong Kong's share drop dramatically from
12.1% to 6.3%% in two years after 1978, the first year of imposition of
GQ. However, we have to bear in mind that the Norwegian version of GQ
is not a truly global one. Six developing countries as well as EEC and
EFTA countries are exempted from this restriction. During 1982, the
bilateral agreements of these countries began to expire. Not until the
end of 1982, the end of bilateral agreements of all those six
developing countries, can the shares reflect the competitiveness of
Hong Kong's lower rank products. We discover that the share of Hong
Kong drops substantially immediately after 1977, from 12.1 to 6.3 in
1979, and then increase a little bit after 1981, from 6.77 to 7.81 in
1983. Even we'compare the share of Hong Kong in 1977 and 1983, we can
still discover a drop in share as well as increase in shares in other
developing states like Thailand, India, Singapore and Malaysia, which
should be an evidence of support to our proposition.
In Canada (Table 3.3), GQ was imposed from 1977 to 1978. Share
changes after 1976 are not to be very high. It seems to suggest that
VER agreement in Canada does.not provide much protection for Hong
Kong's clothing import. This maybe because only small number of
products were put under bilateral agreements for all exporting
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countries before the GQ (All the developing countries including Hong
Kong had one to two products subject to VER agreement before 1977,
according to Textile and Clothing in the World Economy).
To support the agruement that Hong Kong is not so competitive in
its lower rank products, we can take a look to Japanese market (Table
3.4). After 1970, Hong Kong's share drop successively, accompanied by
the increase in share of Korea in the same period. After 1973,
however, its share remains relatively stable. It seems suggesting that
lower rank products from Hong Kong have been replaced by that from
Korea.
Another example is the U.S. (Table 3.5), where no switching of
policy has occurred. Unlike other countries we have examined, Hong
Kong's share in the U.S. is quite stable, except that after 1984. The
stable share in the earlier years should be attributed to the
protection under VER. Decrease in share after 1984 maybe a result of
the entry of China in the US market on a large scale. In US, restraint
agreement with China is more generous than that of Hong Kong, allowing
its export to grow in a faster pace.
Up to now, the data we got seem to support the agruement that VER
has given some sort of protection to Hong Kong. However, we still need
to see whether or not Hong Kong's lower rank products are under the
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shelter of this protection. We will order the top-ten-share items'
code numbers and their respective unit price to see their change in
position during the years. From this, we can gain some knowledge about
products competitiveness. There are some items that are unable for us
to calculate their unit price simply because no data on quantity be
available.
In Norway, the most obvious evidence of increased importance of
higher quality product is the fading out of item 1866 from top-ten
list and the advance in position of 1465 after the imposition of GQ.
We note that both of the items represent the same type of product
'Jacket pullovers for female' but are of different materials. The
first is made of MMF while the second wool and the UVI of the latter
.product is much higher. Another evidence can be found for item 1462
('Jacket pullover of wool for male') which also advances its position
in the period.
In Australia, we also find the same phenomenon of high rank items
substitution for low rank ones during the policy change. Item 1465
once again replace the position of item 1866 after 1976. The appearing
of item 1302 ('gloves leather') to be the top share item in 79 and 80
maybe because it was free of tariff quota restriction in that period.
In Canada, during the period of GQ, we still see the significant
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advance in position of item 1465 and 1302, both of them represent
higher quality products.
In Japan, the situation is simple. Hong Kong has long been
specialized on exporting high quality products- item 1465, 1462, and
2010 (Fur clothing) almost occupied the top-three positions in every
year after 1974, reflecting the relative competitiveness of those
products. In contrast, the top three items are always occupied by
items made of cotton in the U.S. market. We have to note that Hong
Kong is the world's largest quota holder of US's cotton clothing as a
result of early entry in the world clothing market. Cotton clothing
was restricted in 1960 before MMF and woolen clothing were restricted,
when Taiwan and Korea were not large cotton clothing suppliers at that
time. This may explain the high import share of cotton clothing in the
US's market, which cannot be found in other importing countries
especially those more industrialized ones e.g. Japan.
In the following tables, the shares are calculated according to Commodity Trade Statistics,
United Nations, various issues.
Table 6.1 COMPARATIVE SHARE OF HONG KONG'S CLOTHING EXPORT TO AUSTRALIAN MARKET
H. K. INDIA INDON. MALAYSIA PHILI. SINGA. SRI LANKA THAIL. CHINA KOREA JAPAN
1966 22.08 6.4 10.08
1969 27.8 6.77 1.98 8
1970 30.51 0.62 0.45 7.14 1.32 7.41
1972 30 12.5 1.7 4.5
1973 29.61 5.79 0.52 0.51 0.11 10.95 3.59 3.55
1974 33 6.6 6.5 2.3
1975 32.2 2.63 0.23 0.99 2.56 2.21 1.06 8.8 7.5 2.5
1976 29.1 6.3 8.5 3.9
1977 24.6 8.4 7.1 3
1978 23 6.06 0.47 0.7 2.57 0.53 0.56 7.7 9 2.5
1979 23.2 11 6.4 2
1980 23.53 3.05 3.23 1.26 3.67 1.18 0.87 14.52 4.95 2
1981 23.53 4.61 3.18 1.13 3.53 0.79 0.08 0.65 13.47 6.83 2.04
1982 24.33 3.95 1.05 1.11 2.99 0.53 0.09 0.66 13.6 8.97 1.75
1985 22.79 3.8 0.53 0.86 1.92 0.14 0.1 1.12 15.07 10.27 2.24
1986 21.1 3.94 0.69 0.83 1.51 0.17 0.03 1.32 17.4 10 2
Table 6.2 COMPARATIVE SHARE OF HONG KONG'S CLOTHING COMMODITIES IN NORWAYMARKET
H.K. THAILAND INDIA SINGAPORE PHIL. MALAYSIA CHINA KOREA JAPAN
1972 7.66 0.64 0.18 0.32 0.24 0.06 0.31
1973 8.09 0.05 1.19 0.05 0.53 0.28 0.08 0.29
1975 11.00 0.44 0.65 0.24
0.53 0.61 0.44 0.31 0.351976 12.70 0.19 1.72 0.23
0.410.25 0.28 1.720.71 0.51 0.180.3812.101977
0.480.26 0.34 1.24 0.170.78 0.510.538.021978
0.480.45 0.68 0,120.71 0.450.806.30 0.571979
0.77 0.81 0.160.530.79 0.480.760.736.461980
1.05 0.870.44 0.70 0.230.771.030.986.771981
0.820.50 1.15 0.110.470.640.730.757.041982
1.060.29 1.30 0.180.44 0.220.720.467.811983
1.25 1.57 0.140.340.180.65 0.480.407.201985
1.630.38 1.62 0.150.260.470.560.446.501986
2.13 1.85 0.150.47 0.25 0.520.670.587.041987
Table 6.3 MARKET SHARE OF HONG KONG'S CLOTHING COMMODITIES TO CANADIAN MARKET
H.K. INDIA INDON. MALAYSIA PHILI. SINGAPORE TRAIL. SRI LANKA CHINA KOREA JAPAN
1970 17.32 0.31 0.23 0.96 3.83 3.72 16.631971 17.36 0.25 0.43 0.09 0.47 17.27 12.971972 15.55 0.26 0.26 0.17 0.54 0.08 5.53 7.95 1.001973 13.21 0.49 0.38 0.19 0.33 0.14 5.32 12.36 5.851974 12.80 1.12 0.33 0.63 0.27 0.14 5.17 12.30 3.501975 17.00 1.74 0.35 0.92 0.38 0.09 4.00 12.90 2.701976 19
5.4 18.8 2.31977 18.20 0.87 0.25 0.94 0.13 0.05 0.02 5.10 18.30 2.441978 19.4 1.37 0.33 0.96 0.21 0.06 4.5 18.5 1.91979 17.80 1.83 0.04 0.54 1.44 0.45 0.65 0.08 6.80 16.70 1.301980 22.9 2.12 0.05 0.42 1.65 0.44 0.74 0.07 6.8 14.4 1.21981 22.50 3.10 0.08 0.54 2.36 0.91 0.52 0.24 5.80 17.20 1.40
1982 21.5 6.5 20 1.2
1983 22.8 7.8 18.8 1.6
1984 20.57 2.95 0.63 1.31 2.06 0.97 1.67 0.62 8.76 18.52 1.61
1985 18.4 3.45 1.28 1.34 1.86 0.71 1.61 0.61 8.5 16.8 1.8
1987 17.99 2.20 1.03 1.48 1.80 0.94 1.63 0.70 11.34 17.41 1.24
Table 6.4 COMPARATIVE SHARE OF HONG KONG'S CLOTHING COMMODITIES IN JAPANESE MARKET
H. K. INDIA INDON. MALAYSIA PHILI. SINGAPORE THAIL. SRI LANKA KOREA CHINA
1969 15.98 5.72 17.74
1970 20.59 0.47 0.53 0.18 13.77 11.17
1971 18.88 0.27 0.13 0.42 0.09 16.2 31.1
1972 12.30 0.41 0.13 0.28 0.36 0.21 22.70 30.90
1973 10.80 0.65 0.52 0.24 1.36 1.24 0.84 39.50 8.20
1974 10.10 0.28 0.06 0.10 0.60 0.41 0.49 39.50 12.00
1975 12.82 0.25 0.04 0.57 0.11 0.85 35.95 10.3
1976 11.10 0.55 0.02 0.02 1.21 0.07 0.45 45.10 5.80
1977 10.28 0.87 0.03 0.08 0.56 0.07 0.29 43.9 6.5
1978 9.80 1.28 0.04 0.15 0.48 0.11 0.23 43.00 6.50
1979 9.40 1.65 0.07 0.18 0.99 0.13 0.30 0.01 37.00 9,40
1980 10.00 1.55 0.05 0.19 0.111.17 0.39 0.03 30.00 15.30
1981 11.80 0.071.33 0.94 0.07 0.31 0.02 34.20 13.80
1982 12.1 33.7 14.9
1983 13.39 1.03 0.09 0.060.34 1.05 0.23 0.02 29.3 18.3
11.8 1.671985 0.09 0.29 0.41 0.05 0.32 0.02 31.1 22.9
11.54 1.02 0.09 0.541986 0.26 0.07 0.51 0.01 34.3 19.3
0.61 0.08 0,951987 10.74 0.23 0.39 0.07 0.02 37.73 17.85
Table 6.5 COMPARATIVE SHARE OF HONG KONG'S CLOTHING COMMODITIES IN U.S. MARKET
H. K. TAIWAN KOREA CHINA JAPAN ITALY SINGA. PHILIPPIN INDIA MEXICO FRANCE
1970 21.1 11.7 9.4 22 8.7 0.9 3 0.31971 22 14.3 11.8 18.1 6.1 1.1 2.3 0.31972 21.4 16.8 12.6 16 5.5 2.1 2.2 0.3
1973 20.3 17.3 11.7 11.7 5.5 3.9 2.6 0.7
1974 20.7 20.1 12.2 7.9 4.6 2.9 3 1.7 6 2.81975 23.3 17.2 15.1 6.1 4 1.7 3 3.5 5.5 3.21976 25.2 17.3 18.1 5.9 3.6 1.6 2.7 2.4 4.1 2.51977 26 17.2 16.4 5,7 3.6 1.3 3.2 1.8 3.7 2.51978 24.2 17.7 17,2 1.1 4.8 3.2 2.1 3.4 2.8 3.4 2.31979 25.2 18.2 16.3 2.6 3.2 3.2 2.1 3.6 2.9 3.6 21980 25.9 19.6 15.9 3.9 3.1 2.7 2.1 3.5 2.4 3.6 1.61981 25.2 17.8 17.1 5.5 3.7 2.5 2 3.7 3.3 3.1 1.2
1982 24.3 18.7 17.1 7.6 3.1 2.5 2.1 3.4 1.9 2.2 1.1
1983 23.2 18.5 17.1 8.1 3.5 2.7 2 3.3 2.4 1.8
1984 22 16.8 16.7 6.7 3.7 4.1 2.2 3.1 2.1 1.9
1985 21.8 15.4 15.4 6.4 3.2 4.6 2.2 3 2 1.9 1.5
1986 19.6 15.1 14.7 10 2.6 4.8 2.2 2.7 2.1 1.7 1.3
Table 6.6 Top ten clothing items to the Australian market
The first figure represents the code and the second its unit value
1972 1460 97.16 1866 12.79 1764 6.77 1146 12.96 4165 19.79
1713 15.76 1292 3.85 1733 17.46 9.361890 1488 9.54
1973 1866 14.68 1117 14.72 1460 108.39 1302 3.83 1869 19.10
1713 26.52 4165 21.83 1719 22.10 1764 12.76 1832 11.88
1974 1866 14.68 1117 14.72 1460 108.39 1302 3.83 1869 19.10
1713 26.52 1465 21.83 1719 22.10 1764 12.76 1832 11.88
1866 16.381975 1464 11.39 1460 105.41 1465 24.87 1117 18.24
1890 12.14 1713 29.21 1488 10.95 1302 3.31 1860 49.21
1976 1866 19.42 1117 23.47 1460 124.391465 31.46 1713 24.85
1464 12.07 1302 3.27 1431 8.96 1126 23.88 1719 24.70
1977 1866 18.26 1431 7.92 1465 34.44 1302 3.46 8435 2.38
1764 14.21 1739 13.47 1464 10.57 1117 20.76 1713 27.14
1465 28.22 1866 17.031978 1431 8.24 1302 3.56 1739 16.39
84351117 19.87 2.31 1292 1719 26.265.28 1462 37.20
5.05 1866 19.34 1739 20.69 1465 28.13 1764 16.131979 1302
1431 9.23 1462 31.20 12921117 22.41 1146 22.46 5.80
1866 22.37 1739 21.31 1431 11.855.98 1465 34.121980 1302
1464 14.23 14851146 26.42 1462 33.94 5.961764 19.24
5.67 1117 25.12 1866 25.731739 25.37 13021981 1465 36.37
1462 32.98 1719 35.951146 29.28 1464 16.821431 12.99
1462 33.38 1739 26.541146 35.771117 30.301465 35.681982
1832 16.23 1719 37.924.9713021866 30.141431 15.79
1117 34.94 1739 25.401462 40.071431 17.781465 38.591983
1832 13.73 1302 4.761866 27.531146 34.531464 15.89
1117 44.251146 43.471462 39.951431 22.931465 46.411984
4.08 1137 35.6215327.05 1739 33.8913021464 31.13
1464 50.851146 42.121431 22.931462 50.411465 66.301985
1532 4.471739 39.311137 39.511866 53.231117 44.78
1117 40.091464 55.461431 26.391462 61.001465 67.221986
4.72 1137 51.8815321467 46.071866 53.651146 41.17
1117 50.741464 60.691462 82.061431 34.101987 1465 84.87
7.5912961467 51.5412991146 49.261866 61.89
Table 6.7 Top ten clothing items to the Norwegian market
1972 1117 9.84 1866 11.25 1739 8.64 1465 14.45 1764 10.21
1713 19.30 1863 10.71 1844 1.10 1260 2.39 1462 15.73
1973 1764 12.23 1117 13.63 1465 16.94 1739 10.96 1866 13.60
1462 17.87 1302 3.74 1713 33.12 1890 13.37 1439 3.14
1974 1764 12.23 1117 13.63 1465 16.94 1739 10.96 1866 13.60
1462 17.87 1302 3.74 1713 33.12 1890 13.37 1439 3.14
1975 1117 14.02 1866 11.85 1713 34.17 1465 16.37 1462 16.89
1764 11.29 1739 10.68 1464 1111 23.958.12 1302 3.55
1976 1117 16.54 1733 33.09 1866 11.60 1713 36.77 1464 8.37
1465 19.53 1134 19.58 1462 19.96 1111 32.65 1152 9.47
1713 34.221977 1117 18.48 1488 10.081465 21.33 1733 39.90
1462 21.35 1866 17.12 1764 16.01 1464 9.751134 22.32
1117 17.91 1465 21.35 1462 21.68 1152 11.731978 1713 38.34
1866 19.331764 15.85 1302 4.74 1134 23.991488 10.47
1462 22.56 1739 19.621713 40.661465 23.111979 1117 20.95
1890 17.661754 21.951764 18.80 1866 21.221152 15.24
1462 26.76 1739 19.191713 47.271117 24.321465 29.361980
1302 8.76 1890 18.893.9914391152 14.961764 19.28
1713 45.79 1739 21.351462 32.321117 25.751465 36.321981
1719 12.781722 56.891764 18.841152 16.051890 21.62
1764 20.891713 54.151462 34.411117 29.141465 38.941982
1890 22.411302 11.461152 19.261739 23.921146 35.31
1146 32.401465 43.811464 28.041713 60.821117 31.491983
1461 31.121111 72.841764 20.741152 20.984511 37.17
1464 36.291111 96.661152 26.601146 37.671117 37.301984
1719 15.201137 36.791462 50.291465 59.911713 70.65
1111 109.101146 40.801117 42.921465 65.641152 28.161985
1713 90.321461 54.061462 57.021137 42.111464 43.39
1152 27.611146 48.181462 72.801465 72.441117 49.691986
1713 105.331137 45.921739 43.641111 99.461461 49.59
1461 63.011464 58.981117 54.171465 83.401462 83.161987
1137 50.751713 133.881111 128.281146 51.331152 32.80
Table 6.8 Top ten clothing items to the Canadian market
7.18 1875 16.8217641713 23.131866 12.078.7218901972
4.7913021111 16.131719 12.661465 19.141733 22.26
3.54 1465 20.0113029.5417641890 11.631866 12.531973
1713 28.331719 17.381.1812617.1014641117 11.37
3.54 1465 20.0113029.5417641890 11.631866 12.531974
1713 28.331719 17.381.187.10 126114641117 11.37
8.7917647.0714641890 11.451866 11.391117 17.681975
1146 13.944.4614311111 27.891465 20.543.911302
5.9014317.2914641146 16.581866 12.221117 16.851976
4.1013021111 26.651764 10.281890 12.561465 22.33
4.2513027.8514311866 13.901465 24.271117 16.721977
1764 10.958.1714648.7914881742 14.961890 11.72
4.2013028.4414311465 24.391742 19.291117 18.011978
1764 11.821146 15.458.8214881866 14.091890 11.88
1866 16.981465 26.981117 21.815.4613021739 22.311979
1764 15.371462 32.441890 14.561146 23.331431 11.16
1866 17.455.2713021739 23.481465 32.841117 24.231980
1736 68.991764 17.459.9318321431 13.461146 26.09
1146 30.015.2713021465 39.721739 26.641117 28.031981
1137 25.531832 10.511736 70.981431 16.731866 22.74
1431 19.891146 31.561465 40.581739 30.361117 31.341982
1736 77.041462 43.201137 30.491866 24.044.771302
1431 21.911117 36.231146 36.011739 32.631465 43.771983
3596 83.531462 45.451866 30.161137 31.965.291302
1117 43.351137 39.791739 39.291146 44.751465 65.611984
1462 64.121131 110.985198 68.571431 30.906.411302
1117 42.161739 39.201137 36.401146 42.171465 65.421985
1161 37.645.8813021464 53.471866 41.511431 27.62
1431 30.031739 42.591137 37.791465 78.981866 42.861986 5.4113021161 41.091464 63.841117 45.011146 40.19
1464 73.491146 46.931465 93.531431 32.461866 48.901987 1462 89.071161 45.031137 43.081117 48.791739 48.60
Table 6.9 Top ten clothing items to the Japanese market
1465 23.76 1462 24.821972 1866 15.01 1117 14.12 2010
1719 20.50 1875 19.61 1431 6.70 1890 10.30 1292 3.77
1462 25.951465 24.67 2010 1117 19.48 1713 48.591973
1866 16.001875 33.06 1146 17.39 1111 41.591719 23.83
1462 25.95 1713 48.59 1719 23.831465 24.67 1117 19.481974
1866 16.00 1733 48.801111 41.591146 17.391875 33.06
1117 21.801462 27.11 1112 214.981465 25.8220101975
9.85 1301 174.1712921866 16.991146 13.321713 67.89
1112 176.621462 31.711117 29.461465 28.3220101976
1301 223.281134 19.781146 17.241866 19.521713 73.57
1713 103.991112 199.171117 29.241465 31.5220101977
1301 189.581866 19.911146 21.351134 24.221462 39.00
1462 40.801112 216.911117 29.161465 37.4120101978
1866 26.591713 103.871111 64.011301 279.831146 24.55
1112 231.851462 46.461117 29.611465 43.7720101979
1146 24.031111 85.441713 113.711431 16.411301 334.01
1462 41.091112 233.101117 36.741465 44.5020101980
1111 109.241713 143.171146 30.201719 43.011866 30.29
1117 37.261462 45.461112 261.491465 54.4020101981
1431 20.851866 37.211301 512.051719 42.601713 129.45
1866 56.901112 345.721117 41.041462 46.5620101982
1309 367.381301 485.271713 151.681111 128.531719 58.54
1112 348.171117 44.001462 55.311465 65.8620101983
1713 205.481111 124.551719 79.181464 61.271866 55.34
1117 46.461713 417.091462 63.751465 72.9420101984
1466 88.001461 61.271866 74.631111 148.671464 64.87
1117 57.921713 378.861462 61.991465 88.8520101985
1866 79.641111 138.881292 22.231466 103.021464 77.64
1292 31.211112 503.441462 63.971465 108.6320101986
1866 104.741466 113.391301 909.611464 85.391111 133.48
1112 521.0113011 131.741462 84.171465 132.2220101987
1309 699.911111 119.261464 79.32'4_f-5 1866 134.171292
Table 6.10 Top ten clothing items to the U.S. market
1972 1146 8.45 1866 12.81 1117 8.39 1465 21.17 1137 8.91
1733 27.51 1890 9.92 1161 7.12 1832 8.06 1431 5.21
1973 1866 13.41 1146 10.56 1117 10.44 1161 10.54 1465 25.44
1163 9.47 1890 11.61 1832 11.01 1137 8.68 1158 30.96
1974 1866 13.41 1146 10.56 1117 10.44 1161 10.54 1465 25.44
1163 9.47 1890 11.61 1832 11.01 1137 8.68 1158 30.96
1975 1146 13.47 1117 14.18 1866 13.38 1161 11.58 1431 6.33
1832 8.72 1465 25.02 1131 40.04 1890 10.01 1158 35.65
1976 1146 17.42 1117 19.28 1866 12.69 1161 12.96 1465 27.36
1431 9.90 1890 11.10 1832 8.12 1137 11.06 1131 29.84
1977 1146 18.14 1117 19.30 1890 10.53 1465 26.91 1866 15.34
1161 11.33 1431 10.71 1137 11.32 1131 43.92 1488 11.16
1978 1146 19.80 1117 21.45 1890 10.31 1137 11.97 1161 12.92
1465 32.25 1866 16.73 1431 14.39 1832 11.40 1488 13.54
1979 1146 22.77 1117 24.03 1137 16.02 1866 19.34 1890 11.71
1161 16.36 1465 30.99 1431 18.76 1488 15.46 1739 25.48
1980 1146 25.91 1117 27.51 1465 36.00 1137 16.79 1161 17.62
1431 20.351890 10.87 1866 22.34 1739 26.04 1488 16.33
1981 1146 30.72 1117 32.30 1137 19.45 1465 48.11 1161 20.04
1431 23.63 1488 18.71 1739 33.801890 11.44 1866 21.72
1137 25.51 1161 24.011982 1146 31.53 1117 33.84 1465 49.13
1866 23.641431 27.74 1488 22.81 5198 43.221890 13.52
5198 53.211137 29.551117 38.58 1465 60.371983 1146 35.04
3596 82.55 1488 30.241161 30.091431 35.991890 16.95
1137 40.29 1117 51.645198 69.451155 48.171984 1146 46.86
1890 20.60 3596 93.031161 41.531465 91.771431 44.01
1161 45.41 1465 92.721117 51.641137 45.221146 47.661985
2010 1890 20.051431 41.441866 40.323596 101.98
1161 45.79 1117 50.951137 47.601466 55.411986 1146 49.40
1431 45.38 3596 111.441866 48.581465 107.231890 27.54
1117 59.57 1161 51.141137 52.991146 59.121987 1466 67.93




In this chapter, we will turn to another issue: How the
concentration of products are affected by different import policies.
We first analyse the four major factors affecting the concentration.
As Wong (1984) has mentioned before, quantitative restriction can
affect the concentration of exported products. The underlining
assumption is the restriction is effective, or quotas are binding. If
that is the case, the restrictions can be thought to have been
hindered the potential capacities of the exporters. So, when there are
unrestricted products, they will try to produce the unrestricted items
under both VER and GQ. Also, provided that VER is source specific and
have the exporters received the rent, it is more sensitive to
strategic promotion in unrestricted categories. Furthermore, VER will
provide protection for restricted items whereas in the case of GQ,
exporting countries will face the competition from each other, just as
the case under free trade. Exporters should be better specialized in
certain items that they are more capable to sell in the market and
abandon the items in which they are less competitive, VER will thus
lead to a more diversified export mix, whereas GQ may lead to a less
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diversified product mix, especially if the coverage of GQ is wide
enough.
The final factor that affects the product concentration is the
market condition. Aside from change of consumer taste that we can say
little about, the other is the change of income. In case of recession
in the importing country, the exporter will be force to produce those
products that they have more advantage in manufacturing. As a result,
the concentration will be getting higher in those period.
Three statistics are used to convey information of concentration
of the different markets: Top-four share, Top-eight share, and
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Let us examine the cases of
different countries in the following paragraphs.
In the U.S. (Table 7.1), from 1968 to 1971, concentration is
getting lower and lower, with HHI decreases from 0.0582 to 0.0341.
After 1971, HHI increases from 0.0341 in 1971 to 0.0498 in 1975, which
may probably due to the imposition of restriction for MMF and woolen
clothing in 1971 and the world recession caused by oil crisis in the
early 70s. After 1975, the concentration began falling again from
0.0498 to 0.0454 in 1977, marked by the recovery of the world market.
During the MFA II period from 1978 to 1981, although the concentration
seems to increase, the amount is not large. This can be reflected by
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the figures of top-8 shares, which are almost constant in this period.
This maybe due to the slow process of penetration in other
unrestricted items. In MFA III period (1982 to 1986), however, the
concentrations decrease noticeably again, with HHI from 0.0394 in 1982
to 0.0328 in 1986, top-eight shares from 42.22,0 to 38.01% in the same
period.
In Japan (Table 7.2), of which the market is free of quantitative
restriction. It is not strange that the trend of HHI is on the
increase over the entire period, except minor setbacks have occurred
in some periods. From 1985 onwards, there seems to have a tendency of
decrease in concentration. This may be caused by the intentional
effort of Japanese government to open its domestic market.
In Norway (Table 7.3), before 1978, the beginning year of GQ,
concentration seems to decrease over time, except years 1972 to 1975
where world recession started, reflecting by the top-8 shares and HHI
values. In 1978 to 1981, the entire GQ period sees the tendency of
increasing concentration monotonically. Starting from 1982, Norway
went back to MFA and concentration decreases from that time on.
Situation in Canada is similar (Table 7.4). In early 70s,
concentration did increase, but it can be explained by the world
recession in this period. It can also be explained by the loose
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condition in agreement for all the exporting states before 1976,
making the situation somewhat similar to free competition. However, in
the period of 1977 to 1978, the period of GQ, we see the increase in
concentration, and in 1979 to 1986, the period of VER, we see the
overall decrease in concentration, conforming to our proposition.
Finally, in Australia (Table 7.5), where tariff quotas have been
introduced in 1974 for some items, getting larger coverage in 1976,
1978 and 1982, covering essentially all the clothing products as a
result. Therefore, it is normal to observe an increase in
concentration starting from 1974 up to 1985.
Table 7.1 Top ten items to the US and top-four, top-eight, Herfindahl Hirschman Indices
The figures under the codes are their respective shares
T4 T8 HHI
1968
1465 1483 1117 1866 1764 1146 1462 1762 1431 1163 1161 1137 1152 1170 1260
13.76 10.59 9.76 6.34 5.83 4.84 3.93 3.22 3.14 3.13 2.96 2.63 2.02 1.90 1.50 40.44% 55.05% 0.0582
1969
1465 1483 1117 1764 1866 1146 1462 1762 1431 1163 1161 1152 1736 1137 1739
11.68 11.61 7.47 6.78 5.63 4.67 4.35 3.71 2.47 2.35 2.22 2.12 1.82 1.76 1.68 37.55% 52.20% 0.0513
1970 1764 1465 1483 1117 1739 1866 1146 1762 1462 1431 1161 1733 1163 1137 1884
8.98 7.96 7.77 6.37 4.88 4.65 3.84 3.34 3.03 2.27 2.24 2.02 1.95 1.94 1.84 31.08% 44.45% 0.0382
1971 1764 1866 1465 1146 1117 1460 1733 1762 1431 1739 1875 1163 1860 1161 1890
7.20 6.24 6.20 6.15 6.15 5.99 3.75 3.22 2.94 2.81 2.34 2.30 2.29 2.11 1.95 25.80% 41,69% 0.0341
1972 1146 1866 1117 1465 1137 1733 1890 1161 1832 1431 1460 1163 1764 1860 1301
8.72 8.34 7.36 6.57 3.28 3.27 3.26 3.19 3.09 2.81 2.80 2.49 2.46 2.35 1.75 30.98% 40.79% 0.0364
1973 1866 1146 1117 1161 1465 1163 1890 1832 1137 1158 1431 1860 1764 1713 1301
9.78 7.73 7.59 5.83 4.82 4.26 3.68 3.52 2.88 2.66 2.56 2.26 2.03 1.97 1.73 30,92% 43.68% 0.0385
1974 1866 1146 1117 1161 1465 1163 1890 1832 1137 1158 1431 1860 1764 1713 1301
9.78 7.73 7.59 5.83 4.82 4.26 3.68 3.52 2.88 2.66 2.56 2.26 2.03 1.97 1.73 30.92% 43.67% 0.0384
1975 1146 1117 1866 1161 1431 1832 1465 1131 1890 1158 1111 1137 1163 1488 1860
12.26 11.26 7.63 6.21 4.42 4.04 3.90 3.10 3.03 2.98 2.55 2.42 2.00 1.68 1.58 37.36% 49.73% 0.0498
1976 1146 1117 1866 1161 1465 1431 1890 1832 1137 1131 1163 1158 1464 1733 1111
12.82 9.44 6.63 5.10 3.99 3.96 3.56 2.91 2.44 2.41 2.33 2.31 2.28 2.17 2.17 33.99% 45.50% 0.0444
1977 1146 1117 1890 1465 1866 1161 1431 1137 1131 1488 1832 1464 1733 1163 1134
13.71 8.52 6.29 5.91 4.46 4.36 3.74 2.55 2.25 2.09 1.99 1.91 1.88 1.85 1.83 34.43% 46.99% 0.0454
1978
1146 1117 1890 1137 1161 1465 1866 1431 1832 1488 1739 1462 1733 1163 1464
12.14 8.02 5.87 5.11 4.63 4.50 4.28 3.50 2.56 2.55 2.55 1.91 1.60 1.60 1.49 31.13% 44.54% 0.0404
1979
1146 1117 1137 1866 1890 1161 1465 1431 1488 1739 1163 1832 1464 1302 3593
11.99 8.45 5.77 4.71 4.39 4.39 3.88 3.82 3.04 2.86 2.55 2.03 1.99 1.95 1.90 30.92% 43.58% 0.0407
1980 1146 1117 1465 1137 1161 1431 1890 1866 1739 1488 1832 1163 3593 1131 1464
11.89 8.94 5.78 4.94 4.28 4.26 4.11 3.57 2.90 2.56 2.27 2.18 2.18 2.12 2.10 31.55% 44.20% 0.0413
1981 1146 1117 1137 1465 1161 1890 1431 1488 1739 1866 3596 1464 1131 1733 1489
14.35 8.08 5.64 5.01 4.04 3.84 3.61 3.10 2.94 2.91 2.88 2.11 2.05 2.03 1.96 33.08% 44.56% 0.0454
1982 1146 1117 1137 1161 1465 1890 1431 1488 1866 5198 1739 1733 3596 1163 1462
11.86 7.35 6.70 4.41 4.34 3.87 3.68 3.42 2.87 2.71 2.56 2.30 2.23 2.14 2.06 30.32% 42.22% 0.0394
1983 1146 1117 1137 5198 1465 1890 1431 1161 3596 1488 1866 1739 1733 3390 1163
11.08 5.58 5.55 4.54 3.99 3.88 3.83 3.68 3.20 2.86 2.64 2.57 2.24 2.11 2_9 26.75% 38.44% 0.0348
1984 1146 1155 5198 1137 1117 1431 1465 1161 1890 3596 1866 2010 1163 1488 1489
10.06 9.35 6.07 5.19 4.41 3.56 3.41 3.27 2.87 2.71 2.49 2.24 2.20 2.15 1.96 30.67% 42.05% 0.0380
1985 1146 1137 1117 1161 1465 3596 1866 1431 2010 1890 1488 5198 1739 1464 1489
11.32 6.39 4.99 4.83 4.11 3.51 3.49 3.40 2.94 2.82 2.63 2.59 2.40 2.22 2.07 27.53% 38.65% 0.0350
1986 1146 1466 1137 1161 1117 1890 1465 1866 1431 3596 1488 2010 1739 1464 1489
8.95 8.07 5.47 4.52 3.81 3.70 3.49 3.32 3.03 2.94 2.91 2.54 2.31 2.13 1.92 27.02% 38.01% 0.0328
1987 1466 1146 1137 1117 1161 1890 1488 1465 2010 1866 3596 1431 1832 1464 1739
9.06 8.36 5.29 4.88 4.37 3.73 3.58 3.56 2.89 2.79 2.79 2.60 2.15 2.06 1.92 27.58% 39.26% 0.0337
Table 7.2 Top ten items to the Japanese and top-four, top-eight, Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices
The figures under the codes are their respective shares
T4 T8 HHI
1968 1483 1483 1465 1465 1442 1442 1468 1468 1132 1132 1292 1292 1291 1291 1431
20.97 20.97 13.56 13.56 1.61 1.61 1.59 1.59 1.37 1.37 1.05 1.05 0.95 0.95 0.67 69.06% 73.87% 0.1271
1969 1483 1465 1125 1468 1117 1442 1292 1884 1462 1431 1832 1733 1736 1291 1751
25.88 23.83 9.51 5.21 3.41 3.19 2.48 2.34 2.23 1.92 1.68 1.66 1.44 1.31 0.99 64.44% 73.52% 0.1413
1970 1465 1462 1483 1117 1884 1125 1468 1713 1866 1429 1431 1733 1292 1442 1146
19.51 13.75 13.69 6.89 6.45 4.26 3.69 3.13 2.82 2.44 2.01 1.87 1.30 0.96 0.93 53.84% 68.24% 0.0920
1971 1429 1465 1460 1462 1117 1866 1860 1146 1424 1423 1733 1134 1431 1125 1292
37.38 10.15 6.56 5.81 4.80 3.68 3.12 2.45 2.23 2.07 1.75 1.66 1.33 1.26 1.20 59.91% 71.51% 0.1655
1972 1465 1462 1866 1117 2010 1719 1875 1431 1890 1292 1146 1863 1488 1832 1713
24.05 14.11 5.08 4.87 4.07 3.82 2.66 2.59 2.17 1.98 1.69 1.67 1.57 1.56 1.53 48.11% 58.66% 0.0912
1973 1465 1462 2010 1117 1713 1719 1875 1146 1111 1866 1733 1112 1764 1431 1301
15.92 12.23 8.94 7.56 5.77 5.23 3.79 3.43 2.97 2.76 2.42 2.24 1.64 1.62 1.32 44.65% 59.44% 0.0675
1974 1465 1462 1117 1713 1719 1875 1146 1111 1866 1733 1112 1764 1431 1301 1832
17.44 13.39 8.28 6.32 5.73 4.15 3.76 3.26 3,02 2.65 2.46 1.80 1.77 1.44 1.34 45.43% 59.06% 0.0713
1975 2010 1465 1462 1112 1117 1713 1146 1866 1292 1301 1719 1890 1111 1733 1131
22.77 17.57 9.41 4.48 4.28 4.15 4.06 3.80 2.74 2.55 2.53 2.17 2.10 1.78 1.21 54.22% 66.72% 0.1 044
1976 2010 1465 1117 1462 1112 1713 1866 1146 1134 1301 1890 1719 1111 1460 1863
23.59 14.21 11.34 7.73 4.55 4.06 3.54 3.27 2.32 2.16 1.80 1.62 1.57 1.47 1.21 56.88% 69.03% 0.1039
1977 2010 1465 1117 1112 1713 1462 1134 1146 1866 1301 1292 1719 1460 1111 1863
34.39 11.56 10.14 6.43 3.91 3.72 2.61 2.14 2.08 2.06 2.01 1.65 1.29 1.26 0.93 62.52% 72.75% 0.1527
1978 2010 1465 1117 1112 1462 1146 1301 1111 1713 1866 1460 1292 1252 1719 1134
47.82 10.01 8.42 4.95 2.79 2.21 2.14 1.68 1.59 1.54 1.05 1.02 0.94 0.93 0.79 71.20% 78.34% 0.2516
1979 2010 1465 1117 1462 1112 1301 1431 1713 1111 1146 1866 1719 1460 1134 3593
45.08 10.70 7.60 3.94 2.84 2.47 2.15 1.75 1.69 1.68 1.53 1.48 1.16 1.03 0.91 67.32% 74.79% 0.2260
1980 2010 1465 1117 1112 1462 1866 1719 1146 1713 1111 1301 1134 1431 1869 1739
41.33 11.60 7.12 3.79 3.09 2.55 2.11 2.07 1.92 1.67 1.61 1.32 1.22 1.20 1.10 63.84% 71.59% 0.1955
1981 2010 1465 1112 1462 1117 1713 1719 1301 1866 1431 1111 1146 1134 1292 1739
57.72 11.56 3.04 2.86 2.76 2.13 1.84 1.54 1.44 0.97 0.97 0.89 0.74 0.55 0.55 75.17% 81.91% 0.3509
1982 2010 1462 1117 1112 1866 1719 1111 1713 1301 1309 1465 1464 1146 1431 1292
63.25 5.76 3.18 3.07 2.09 1.96 1.90 1.56 1.44 1.31 1.28 1.27 1.06 1.04 0.59 75.26% 81.20% 0.4079
1983 2010 1465 1462 1117 1112 1866 1464 1719 1111 1713 1252 1292 1461 1431 1466
62.63 9.57 4.88 2.77 2.69 1.64 1.43 1.38 1.35 1.22 0.78 0.78 0.70 0.62 0.57 79.85% 85.61% 0.4067
1984 2010 1465 1462 1713 1117 1464 1111 1866 1461 1466 1719 1146 1863 1468 1301
72.58 10.22 3.73 2.16 1.27 1.19 0.98 0.96 0.68 0.64 0.57 0.44 0.37 0.32 0.28 88.70% 92.13% 0.5399
1985 2010 1465 1462 1713 1117 1464 1466 1292 1111 1866 1461 1301 1468 1719 1745
63.73 13.65 3.95 2.85 1.84 1.37 1.21 1.19 1.06 0.90 0.73 0.71 0.64 0.43 0.38 84.18% 88.60% 0.4285
1986 2010 1465 1462 1112 1292 1111 1464 1301 1466 1866 1713 1309 1117 1252 1468
66.69 11.51 4.36 1.99 1.28 1.26 0.98 0.84 0.78 0.71 0.66 0.60 0.56 0.54 0.53 84.56% 88.08% 0.4612
1987 2010 1465 1462 1301 1112 1292 1866 1464 1111 1309 1466 1117 3596 1146 1468
63.99 11.18 4.12 2.24 1.57 1.25 1.10 0.99 0.98 0.85 0.78 0.78 0.74 0.73 0.46 81.54% 85.46% 0.4254
Table 7.3 Top ten items to the Norwegian and top-four, top-eight, Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices
The figures under the codes are their respective shares
T4 T8 HHI
1465 1866 1117 1713 1134 1462 1739 1292 1844 1161 1186 1736 1131 1766 18871968
16.48 7.61 6.84 5.02 5.00 4.66 3.53 3.44 3.35 2.64 2.64 1.99 1.76 1.49 1.43 35.95% 49.14% 0.0535
1866 1465 1713 1462 1863 1134 1117 1844 1739 1764 1260 1186 1292 1152 14311969
9.48 7.73 7.58 6.67 4.98 4.38 4.35 3.08 2.34 2.17 2.12 2.05 1.98 1.95 1.83 31.46% 45.17% 0.0391
1866 1713 1465 1117 1462 1863 1764 1134 1733 1719 1739 1431 1260 1844 17541970
13.52 7.45 6.33 4.77 4.41 3.73 3.23 3.18 2.65 2.18 2.12 2.11 1.93 1.91 1.89 32.06% 43.44% 0.0426
1866 1863 1117 1465 1713 1764 1890 1157 1462 1260 1134 1733 1419 1739 1439
1971
15.67 7.24 6.53 4.33 3.60 3.50 3.05 2.94 2.39 2.14 2.14 2.08 2.06 1.99 1.83 33.77% 43.92% 0.0472
1117 1866 1739 1465 1764 1713 1863 1844 1260 1462 1163 1302 1134 1439 1152
1972 1R R R1 R 11 6.20 4.69 4.38 3.38 3.11 2.92 2.90 2.90 2.82 2.73 2.71 2.56 32.32% 44.77% 0.0414
1764 1117 1465 1739 1866 1462 1302 1713 1890 1439 1152 1260 1111 1844 1464
1973 10.02 10.01 6.92 5.65 4.63 4.12 3.34 3.32 3.29 3.26 2.97 2.60 2.28 2.25 2.24 32.60% 44.68% 0.0430
1764 1117 1465 1739 1866 1462 1302 1713 1890 1439 1152 Hbu 1111 1099 1909
1974 10.02 10.01 6.91 5.65 4.63 4.12 3.33 3.32 3.29 3.25 2.97 2.59 2.28 2.25 2.24 32.59% 44.67% 0.0430
1117 1866 1713 1465 1462 1764 1739 1464 1111 1302 1863 1890 1439 1146 1488
1975
10.56 7.86 7.51 6.55 5.52 5.10 3.48 3.38 3.17 3.13 2.94 2.84 2.40 2.24 1.98 32.48% 46.58% 0.0435
1976 25.35% 38.91% 0.03401117 1733 1866 1713 1969 1465 3.87 1462 3.35 3.30 3.23 3.06 2.89 2.53 2.48
7.46 6.05 5.94 5.90 5.71 3.97 3.87 3.67 3.35 3.30 2.23 2.89 2.53 2.48
1117 1713 1465 1488 1733 1462 1866 1134 1764 1464 1151 1739 1439 1119 lna3
1977 30.28% 41.81% 0 ,038610.13 8.21 7.21 4.73 4.29 3.69 3.54 3.52 3.24 3.14 2.92 2.66 2.46 2.30 1.93
1978 1117 1465 1713 1462 1152 1488 1764 1302 1866 1134 1739 1137 1431 8435 1464
9.63 8.74 6.20 4.29 3.79 3.49 3.38 3.19 3.13 2.73 2.71 2.45 2.18 2.15 1.95 28.86% 39.52% 0.0358
1979 1117 1465 1713 1462 1739 1152 1764 1866 1754 1890 1439 1302 1146 1722 1431
11.22 8.72 7.22 6.63 4.35 3.86 3.81 3.68 2.48 2.45 2.33 1.84 1.83 1.72 1.68 33.79% 45.82% 0.0419
198C 1465 1117 1713 1462 1739 1764 1152 1439 1302 1890 1431 1464 1722 1754 8435
12.94 10.08 7.61 7.36 3.48 3.01 2.91 2.69 2.66 2.66 2.61 2.26 2.11 1.63 1.62 37.99% 47.38% 0.0480
191 1465 1117 1462 1713 1739 1890 1152 1764 1722 1719 1754 1302 1838 6272 1146
20.22 8.25 8.10 5.47 3.29 2.99 2.84 2.34 2.17 2.02 1.98 1.98 1.91 1.79 1.77 42.04% 51.17% 0.0658
1465 1117 1462 1713 1764 1146 1739 1152 1302 1890 1137 1754 1131 1838 14311982
13.29 9.95 6.88 6.65 3.92 3.81 3.72 2.88 2.22 2.08 1.98 1.85 1.82 1.79 1.77 36.76% 48.21% 0.0475
1117 1713 1464 1465 1146 4511 1152 1764 1111 1461 1739 1866 1137 1719 18631983
9.04 5.52 5.44 5.26 4.82 3.98 3.42 3.41 3.23 2.88 2.66 2.62 2.30 2.16 2.16 25,26% 37.48% 0.0317
1117 1146 1152 1111 1464 1713 1465 1462 1137 1719 1131 1838 1739 1163 14611984
10.27 6.56 5.76 5.63 4.75 4.22 4.16 3.48 3.15 2.99 2.75 2.50 2.49 2.21 2.14 28.22% 41.34% 0.0367
1152 1465 1117 1146 1111 1464 1137 1462 1461 1713 1838 1719 1131 1866 11611985
6.88 6.86 6.73 6.17 5.45 4.64 4.45 3.76 3.18 2.76 2.75 2.52 2.47 2.24 2.10 26.63% 41.17% 0.0343
1117 1465 1462 1146 1152 1461 1111 1739 1137 1713 1464 1301 1131 1719 18661986
7.25 6.99 5.51 4.88 4.69 4.58 3.93 3.52 3.50 3.38 3.29 2.29 2.29 2.28 2.24 24.63% 37.83% 0.0322
1462 1465 1117 1464 1461 1152 1146 1111 1713 1137 1739 1161 1838 1866 14311987
7.58 7.41 6.46 5.84 4.92 4.77 3.80 3.56 3.46 2.98 2.63 2.31 2.20 2.19 1.96 27.29% 40.79% 0.0342
Table 7.4 Top ten items to the Canadian and top-four, top-eiqht, Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices
The figures under the codes are their respective shares
T4 t8 HHI
1968 1117 1719 1465 1866 1462 1431 1762 1464 1161 1146 1137 1887 1163 1186 1134
15.52 13.19 7.89 6.88 4.70 3.14 2.90 2.41 2.34 2.25 2.10 1.98 1.87 1.80 1.73 43.48% 54.22% 0.0621
1969 1719 1117 1465 1462 1764 1866 1762 1431 1161 1887 1163 1146 1713 1736
12.85 10.96 6.80 6.50 4.20 4.03 3.00 2.91 2.81 2.63 2.37 2.01 1.90 1.85 1.77 37.08% 48.31% 0.0487
1970 1117 1719 1764 1465 1163 1462 1431 1137 1887 1866 1713 1161 1733 1483 1832
11.45 10.80 5.67 4.58 4.05 3.83 3.22 2.84 2.74 2.68 2.51 2.46 2.08 2.02 1.83 32.51% 43.61% 0.0426
1971 1117 1719 1764 1733 1875 1866 1890 1878 1146 1419 1465 18474 1887 1431
9.25 8.25 6.58 4.49 4.30 4.15 3.81 3.54 3.50 2.87 2.63 2.58 2.39 2.30 2.19 28.57% 40.84% 0.0361
1972 1890 1866 1713 1764 1875 1733 1465 1719 1111 1302 1863 1832 1261 1844 1431
7.34 6.46 5.99 4.55 4.51 4.26 4.25 3.64 2.99 2.59 2.42 2.31 2.19 2.06 25.35% 38.66% 0.0327
1973 1866 1890 1764 1302 1465 1117 1464 12+61 1719 1713 1733 1762 1163 1462 1739
10.14 9.01 6.14 5.43 5.07 4.41 3.81 3.05 2.98 2.77 2.71 2.16 1.88 1.82 31.00% 44.29% 0.0401
1974 1866 1890 1764 1302 1465 1117 1464 1261 1719 1713 1733 1762 1163 1462 1739
10.14 9.01 6.41 5.43 5.07 4.41 3.81 3.05 2.97 2.77 2.16 2.06 1.88 1.82 30.99% 44.27% 0.0401
1975 1117 1866 1890 1464 1764 1302 1465 1111 1431 1146 1869 1131 1733 1488 1713
11.73 8.81 8.07 7.30 4.02 3.86 3.79 3.04 2.93 2.71 2.67 2.50 2.33 1.93 1.91 35.91% 47.58% 0.0461
1976 1117 1866 1146 1464 1431 1465 1890 1764 1111 1302 1869 1131 1134 1713 1158
14.83 8.34 6.41 5.22 4.31 4.14 3.90 3.42 2.84 2.70 2.65 2.62 2.17 2.09 2.01 34.82% 47.16% 0.0492
1977 1117 1465 1866 1431 1302 1890 1742 1488 1464 1764 1713 1146 1733 1869 1134
9.38 9.03 6.82 5.81 4.62 4.51 4.04 3.92 3.72 3.63 2.69 2.59 2.55 2.24 2.05 31.04% 44.21% 0.0404
1978 1117 1742 1465 1431 1302 1890 1866 1488 1146 1764 1832 1137 1722 1462 1751
12.47 7.40 7.18 5.31 5.07 4.98 4.76 3.50 3.23 2.77 2.40 2.29 2.03 1.91 1.91 32.35% 47.17% 0.0443
1979 1739 1302 1117 1465 1866 1431 1146 1890 1462 1764 1832 1137 1751 1722 1736
10.00 8.20 8.04 6.22 5.67 4.95 3.05 2.84 2.75 2.75 2.30 1.98 1.92 1.86 1.55 32.47% 46.14% 0.0406
1980 1117 1465 1739 1302 1866 1146 1.431 1832 1764 1736 1464 1462 1137 3593 1722
11.83 8.87 8.25. 7.08 5.50 4.55 4.09 3.38 2.42 2.16 2.07 1.72 1.70 1.64 1.48 36.04% 50.17% 0.0466
1981 1117 1739 1465 1302 1146 1866 1431 1736 1832 1137 1462 1764 3596 1762 1131
11.67 9.61 8.26 6.16 4.34 4.02 3.76 3.52 2.76 2.65 2.53 1.83 1.75 1.65 1.62 35.70% 47.83% 0.0454
1117 1739 1465 1146 1431 1302 1866 1137 1462 1736 1764 1832 1464 1131 11611982
9.79 8.47 7.96 7.50 4.57 3.93 3.75 3.59 2.59 2.55 2.30 2.21 1.86 1.82 1.75 33.73% 45.98% 0.0413
1465 1739 1146 1117 1431 1302 1137 1866 1462 3596 5198 1832 3390 1464 17361983
11.16 8.17 7.83 6.76 4.80 4.19 3.28 2.66 2.56 2.28 2.26 2.21 2.00 1.87 1.74 33.92% 46.19% 0.0418
1465 1146 1739 1137 1117 1302 1431 5198 1131 1462 1832 1161 1866 1464 11111984
1d_S5 6.64 5.49 5.14 5.02 4.42 3.89 2.59 2.48 2.38 2.27 2.26 2.16 2.15 2.15 28.12% 41.46% 0.0356
1465 1146 1137 1739 1117 1431 1866 1464 1302 1161 1131 1462 1111 1736 18321985
8.43 7.11 6.68 6.12 5.53 4.15 4.14 3.83 3.03 2.60 2.54 2.32 2.19 2.03 1.93 28.34% 42.16% 0.0352
1866 1465 1137 1739 1431 1146 1117 1464 1161 1302 1462 1736 1131 1111 146b1986
7.97 7.01 6.40 6.40 5.93 5.22 4.72 4.64 2.53 2.50 2.28 1.94 1.72 1.71 1.67 27.79% 43.66% 0.0358
1866 1431 1465 1146 1464 1739 1117 1137 1161 1462 1131 2010 1111 1461 17361987
7.85 7.47 7.12 6.76 5.86 4.97 4.89 4.56 3.11 2.02 1.99 1.96 1.75 1.74 1.68 29.19% 44.92% 0.0376
Table 7.5 Top ten items to the Australian and top-four, top-eight, Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices
The figures under the codes are their respective sharess
T4 T8 HHI
1968 1465 1764 1462 1431 1866 1762 1483 1291 1262 1832 1468 1292 1719 1419 1788
13.75 7.69 7.39 6.42 6.39 5.42 4.55 4.23 3.45 3.12 3.05 2.83 2.48 1.16 35.25% 51.61% 0.0528
1969 1465 1866 1483 1462 1431 1291 1262 1111 1292 1764 1719 1419 1117 17331451
11.54 8.27 5.62 5.54 5.40 4.38 4.14 3.57 3.54 3.13 3.02 2.71 2.29 2.13 2.12 30.97% 44.89% 0.0423
1970 1465 1764 1866 1483 146212921117 1291 1431 1713 1262 1419 1111 1733 1411
8.65 8.56 7.25 5.70 4.91 3.97 3.55 3.42 2.91 2.79 2.53 2.41 2.34 2.16 1.90 30.16% 42.59% 0.0372
1971 1764 1460 1465 1462 1292 1117 1866 1419 1431 1733 1713 1860 1291 1754 1411
10.24 9.51 6.57 4.37 4.13 4.01 3.67 3.40 2.65 2.51 2.39 2.38 2.00 30.87% 42.68% 0.0398
1972 1460 1866 1764 1146 4165 1713 1292 1733 1890 1488 1302 1158 1431 1260 1832
6.57 6.08 5.31 5.23 4.77 4.69 3.56 3.39 3.26 3.00 2.63 2.58 2.38 2.25 2.17 23.19% 36.20%0.0294
1973 1866 1117 1460 1302 1869 1713 4165 1719 1764 1832 1733 1292 1875 1464 1890
5.59 4.52 4.42 4.02 3.56 3.52 3.47 3.46 3.16 3.08 3.03 3.01 3.00 2.84 2.78 18.91% 29.45%0.0261
1974 1866 1117 1460 1302 1869 1713 1465 1719 1764 1832 1733 1292 1464 1890 1146
6.19 4.71 4.60 4.18 3.70 3.66 3.61 3.60 3.29 3.21 3.15 3.14 2.95 2.89 2.87 19.68%30.66% 0.0271
1975 1866 1464 1460 1465 1117 1890 1713 1488 1302 1733 1719 1887 1131 1158
9.13 6.20 2.57 5.25 4.60 3.62 3.39 3.30 2.61 2.45 2.42 2.12 2.06 2.05 1.19
26.34% 37.95% 0.0318
1796 1866 1117 1465 1460 1713 1464 1302 1126 1719 1754 1887 1470 1733 1292
10.94 5.61 5.40 3.75 3.54 3.37 3.12 2.37 2.29 2.08 2.06 2.05 2.00 1.99 25.71% 35.74% 0.0316
1977 1866 1431 1465 1302 8435 1764 1739 1464 4447 1292 1460 1832 1470 1719
7.18 6.27 5.49 4.21 3.14 3.12 2.81 2.57 2.52 2.49 2.41 2.32 2.22 2.15 1.94 23.16%32.22% 0.0260
1978 1465 1866 1431 1302 1739 1117 8435 1292 1719 1462 1881 1832 1146 1464
7.58 6.24 5.33 4.48 3.87 3.79 3.13 3.07 2.96 2.82 2.64 2.39 2.22 2.15 2.09 23.63% 34.42% 0.0275
1979 1302 1866 1739 1465 1764 1117 1431 1116 1462 1292 8435 1485 1719 1130 7219
7.04 6.66 6.25 4.92 3.81 3.58 3.10 3.00 2.95 2.83 2.68 2.62 2.18 2.10 1.82 24.87% 35.36% 0.0282
1980 1302 1866 1465 1739 1431 1764 1146 1462 1464 1485 1117 8435 1719 1832 7219
7.79 6.53 6.24 4.81 3.79 3.33 3.24 3.19 3.07 3.06 3.03 2.92 2.56 2.40 2.15 25.37% 35.74% 0.0298
1981 1465 1739 1302 1117 1866 1431 1146 1164 1462 1719 1485 1713 1832 1764 1869
6.37 6.13 4.88 4.67 4.66 4.32 4.24 4.01 3.74 3.09 2.72 2.60 2.53 2.32 2.29 22.04% 35.26% 0.0283
1982 1465 1117 1146 1462 1739 1431 1866 1302 1832 1719 1713 1464 1485 8435 17646.85 6.84 5.75 5.58 4.894.69 4.05 3.22 3.12 2.99 2.44 2.32 2.17 1.91 25.03% 38.66% 0.0303
1983 1465 1431 1462 1117 1739 1464 1146 1866 1832 1302 2010 8435 1485 1713 1764
9.89 6.26 4.87 4.63 4.48 4.28 4.04 4.04 3.20 2.66 2.44 2.34 2.26 2.20 2.16 1.54 25.65% 38.45% 0.0314
1984 1465 1431 1462 1146 1117 1464 1302 1739 1532 1137 1866 1832 1419 1485 1764
1.66 6.15 6.09 4.84 4.23 3.59 2.88 2.78 2.39 2.38 2.24 2.12 2.07 1.72 1.71 28.74% 39.45% 0.0347
1985 1465 1462 1431 1146 1464 1117 1866 1137 1532 1161 1419 1764 1302 1485
11.86 6.75 5.56 4.91 4.59 4.00 3.15 2.68 2.26 2.16 1.90 1.75 1.74 1.73 1.59 29.08% 40.85% 0.0353
1986 1465 1462 1431 1464 1117 1146 18661467 1532 1137 1468 1739 1485 6276 1419
10.17 6.43 5.92 5.89 4.00 3.92 3.76 2.31 1.85 1.72 1.64 1.62 1.60 1.55 1.53 28.41% 40.10% 0.0318
1987 1465 1431 1462 1434 1117 1866 1146 1299 1467 1134 1302 1485 1161 1468
9.33 8.09 4.75 4.47 2.90 2.87 2.25 2.21 2.06 1.96 1.88 1.77 1.69 1.46 26.64% 36.57% 0.0295
CHAPTER 8 
QUALITY UPGRADING
We have mentioned about that there are two kinds of quality 
upgrading, namely, switching to higher rank products and improving the 
quality of products. We said it is more likely^ for the first kind to 
be happened under GQ, ;but not under VER. The reason is GQ is not a 
source specific restriction. Under source specific restriction, like 
VER, less competitive exporters will gain protection for their lower 
rank items, and they cannot substitute higher rank products for lower 
rank ones. It is difficult to study the second type of quality 
upgrading by inspecting the UVIs, due to the various problems in UVIs 
that we have described in chapter two. Therefore, we will concentrate 
on the first kind of quality-upgrading only.
We will compare the ratios of QIs of different material clothing 
among countries. We claim that if the ratio, say woolen/cotton 
clothing QI ratio, gets higher over the years, there has happened a 
first—type quality upgrading process as woolen clothing is a high 
grade product. We take three countries as sample — Australia, the US, 
and Japan. The reason to compare US and Australia is Australia has a 
longer record of global tariff quota. It has imposed it for more than
twelve years from November 1976 to 1987, which seems to provide a more 
reliable base for our deduction. At the same time Japan will act ass a 
reference of situation in free import market.
As we can see from table 8.1, the woolen/cotton clothing QI 
ratios (W/C) and woolen/MMF clothing QI ratios (W/C ) grow mare faster 
in Australia and Japan than that of the US, which should be considered 
as a support for our hypothesis. We can notice two facts in addition. 
The first is growth in W/Ms is more noticeable than that of W/Cs, and 
the second, the growth of ratios in Japan is the fastest. The latter 
should relate to the higher demand for high quality items in Japanese 
market, and the former might be because there exists more high value 
items in cotton clothing than that in MMF clothing.
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Table 8.1 Q l s  of different material clothing and their ratios
in different countries
Th e United States
QI of  QI of QI of   Woolen/  Woolen/
Year Cotton  M M F   Woolen  Cotton    M M F
 Clothing Clothing Clothing
1.974 47.74 52.22 43,76 0.92 0 .84
1975 66 .89 61.32 45.03 0,67 0.73
9976 78 .01 84 .36 61.94 0.79 0.73
1977 .4.29 86.92 8.01.12 1.07 1.16
1978 76.99 97.36 89.53 1.16 0.92
3979 94.02 - 81 .87 81 .75 0 .89 1.00
1980 93.65 84.34 000 .10 8.15 1.28
0*981 0.06.82 101,37 114.71 1 .07 9.13
1982 0.00.00 100 .00 180 ,00 1.00 1.00
1983 0,04.49 189.63 124.-89 1.20 1,14
1084 229 .33 111 .47 121.81 0 .04 1.09
1985 125.21 111.59 119.10 1.19 1,07
9986 159.98 119.35 122.22 1.11 2.02
1987 111.10 116.59 113.22 1.02 1 .97
Australia
QI of  QI of  QI of  Woolen/  Woolen/ 
Year Cotton Woolen Cotton MMF
 Clothing Clothing Clothing
1974 117 .99 197.48 81.10 0 .68 0 .41
1975 77.11 128.18 76.21 0 .99 0.63
.1976 84.61 139.02 70.88 0.84 0.51
31977 83.75 104.89 44.44 0,53 2.42
1978 86.69 810.61 68.14 0 -72 9.56
1979 67.62 103 .26 49.15 0.73 0.48
0980 26.12 03.82 519.95 0.77 0.57
1981 96.39 316.01 85.91 7 .89 0.74
1282 100.00 100.00 100.00 1 ,00 1.00
1983 83.54 89 .43 95.25 1.14 1.14
0.84 15.78 73.96 0.52.67 1 ,59 2.06
.985 *36.21 59.22 117.37 1,36 1.98
i486 81.69 51.74 93 .60 1.16 1-83
^ 87 60 .88 32.86 58.49 0.90 1.78
Japan
QI of   ,QI of  QI of     Woolen/   Woolen/
Year Cotton MM F Woolen Cotton ynirp
Clcthing Clothing Clothing
1974 191.03 323.15 92.85 0 .49 0 29
1975 -39 .72 102.56 8C.46 0.98 0 . 49
1976 156.92 172.14 8 8 . 6 6 0^7 0 52
1977 100.62 U S . 80 CO.96 0.51 0 52
1978 133.56 80.71 58.91 0.44 0 . 7 3
1979 199.39 106.85 78.25 0.39 0 . 73
1980 127.39 133.24 74.63 0.59 0.56
1981 91.88 128.26 89.61 0 .98 0 .70
1982 100.00 100.00 100.00 1 . 00 1.00
1983 90.89 65.88 94.83 0 . 93 1 . 21
1984 34.82 61.13 96.52 1 .14 i ' 5 8
1985 70.42 60.14 38.63 1.26 1.47
1986 34.29 40 .52 106.57 1.26 2.63
1987 141.06 65.70 129.41 9 .92 1 . 97
CANPT E R 9 
CONCLUSION
Through the previous chapters, we have the results that in 
accordance with our theory, the impacts of VER and GQ are different. 
What we have .inspected are just the imports In exporting countries, I 
believe that the imports in importing stare are different also, and 
there are still room for further analysis. .
We also have the result that trade barriers can cause more harm 
than good. Economists can cite many examples such as price control may 
end up w ith other undesirable results - black market, long-queue etc. 
The case of ^ R i s  the protective effect will enable the high-cost 
exporters to continue exporting their loss competitive items, making 
the consumer to pay o^igher price even compared to the case under 
equivalent GQ restriction! the conventional wisdom of non-intervention 




Aug 1974- June 30 1975 Cardigans, sweater etc
MMF knitted and woven dresses
Playsuits for children
Women's and children's non-woolen woven
coats
Women's and children's MMF woven blouses
May 1 1975- June 30 1976 Shirts, knit, men's and boy's, infants
Jackets, cardigans and the like, knit
Blouses, knit, of cotton or MMF,
women's and girls'
Dresses, of cotton or MMF
Trousers, of cotton or MMF, men's art
boys'
Coats, Raincoats and Jackets, of cotton or
MMF, women's, girls' and infant's
Blouses, woven, women's and girls' and
infants', of cotton or MMF
Nightwear, woven, of cotton or MMF,
women's, girls' and infants'
Tariff Quota
Woven shirts and blouses for women, girls,From July 1 1976
and infants
Knitted blouses
Woven coats for women, girls and infants
Dresses
Knitted tracksuits, playsuits for adults
Trousers and Jeans for men and boys.
Woven sleepwear for women, girls and
infants
Certain dressing gowns
Sept 1 1977 Knitted coats, jumpers and the like
Knitted tracksuits for adults
Knitted tracksuits ,playsuits for children
Knitted shirts and blouses for women and
girls and woven shirts and blouses
for women, girls and infants
Woven coats for women, girls and infants
Dresses
Outgarments for women, girls and infants
Trousers and jeans for men, boys
Suits for men and boys
Shorts for men and boys
Woven sleepwear for wome, girls and
infants
Dressing gowns and the like
Undergarments for men and boys
Woven pyjamas and other sleepwear for men
and boys





Oct 1 1972-Sept 30 1973 Shirts
Blouses, woven, of cotton or MMF
Trousers, slacks and shorts ,woven cotton
or MMF
Oct 1 1973-Oct 31 1976 Shirts ,men's and boys
Jan 1 1979-Dec 31 1979
Outerwear
Suits and blazers men's and boys
Shirts men's and boys
Blouses and shirts women's and girls
Sweaters, pullovers
T-shirts and sweaters
Trosers, slacks, men's and boys
Trousers, slacks, women'sand girls
Overalls and coveralls
Dress and skirts
Suits, women's and girls
Children's and infants' wear
Underwear
Shorts











Jan 1 1977-Dec 31 1977 Woven Jacket ,skijackets
Woven slacks, jeans, trousers
Woven dresses, frocks and gowns
Woven skirts
Woven blouses and jumpers, of cotton or
MMF, women's and girls'
Woven nightgarments, of cotton or MMF
women's and girls'
Neckties, of cotton or MMF
Woven shirts, of cotton or MMF, men's and
boys'
Knitted stockings of cotton or MMF
Knitted briefs, drawers, of cotton or MMF
Knitted nightgarments
Knitted jackets
Knitted shirts ,men's and boys
Woven bed sheets men's and boys'
Source:
(Australian Tariff Guota) Textile Asia, 1976, 1978
(Norway, Canada Australia VER)
Hong Kong Trade Department
Annual Report Various issues
Descriptions of SITC codes
1111 Suits Jackets cotton not knit male
1112 Suits Jackets wool not knit male
1113 Suits Jackets textile nes knit male
1114 Overalls cotton not knit male
1117 Slack shorts cotton not knit male
1118 Slacks shorts wool not knit male
1119 Slacks shorts textile nes not knit male
1120 Outergarment nex cotton not knit male
1121 Outergarnent nes wool not knit male
1122 Outergarment nes textil nes not knit male
1123 Raincoat cotton not rubbrized male
1124 Car coats cotton not rubbrized male
1125 Outergarment of rubbrized fabric male
1126 Outergarment plastic materials male
1129 Raincoats textile nes rubbrized female
1130 Raincoat textile not rubbrized female
1131 coats cloaks cotton not knit female
1132 coats cloaks wool not knit female
1133 coats cloaks textile nes not knit female
1134 Skirts dresses cotton not knit female
1135 Skirts dresses wool not knit female
1136 Skirts dresses textile nes not knit female
1137 Blouses cotton not knit/embroider femle
1138 Blouses wool not knit/embroider femle
1139 Blouses textile nes not knit/embrodider female
1140 Blouses cotton not knit embroider female
1141 Blouses wool not knit embroider female
1142 Blouses textile nes not knit embroider female
1143 Overalls cotton not knit female
1146 Slacks shorts cotton not knit female
1147 Slacks shorts wool not knit female
1148 Slacks shorts texile nes not knit female
1149 Outergarment nes cotton not knit female
1150 Outergarment nes wool not knit female
1151 Outergarment nes textile nes not knit female
1152 Outergarment cotton not knit infants
1153 Outergarment wool not knit infants
1154 Outetgarment textile nes not knit infants
1155 Raincoat cotton not rubbrized female
1156 Carcoat cotton not rubbrized female
1157 Outergarments of rubbrized fabric female
1158 Outergarments plastic materials female
1159 Outergarments of rubbrized fabric infants
1160 Outertgarments plastic materials infants
1161 Shirts cotton not knit not dress
1162 Shirts textile nes not knit not dress
1163 Dress shirts cotton not knit
1164 dress shirts textile nes nto knit
1165 Swimsuits cotton not knit male
1167 Undergarments cotton not knit male
1170 Nightgarmernts cotton not knit male
1171 Nightgarments wool not knit male
1172 Nightgarments textile nes not knit male
1173 Under and night garments impermable male
1174 under and light garments plastic male
1175 Shirts wool not knit not dress shrit
1176 Dress shirts wool not knit
1181 Swimsuit cotton not knit female
1183 Under garments cotton not knit female
1185 Under garments textile nes not knit female
1186 Night garments cotton not knit female
1187 Night garments wool not knit female
1188 Night garments textile nes not knit female
1189 Diapers baby napkins
1190 Under and night garments cotton not knit infants
1193 Under and night garments impermable female
1194 Under and night garments plastic female
1195 Under and night garments impermable infants
1196 Under and night garments plastic infants
1211 Hankerchiefs cotton not embroidered
1212 Hankerchiefs cotton embroidered
1213 Hankerchiefs textile nes not embroidered
1214 Hankerchiefs textile nes embroidered
1221 Shawls stoles velts not knit
1222 Scarves mufflers armbands not knit
1230 Neckties cravats
1260 Gloves plastic
1261 Gloves cotton fabric not knit
1262 Gloves textile fabric nes not knit
1263 Gloves not knit nes
1298 Clothing accessories plastic etc nes
1299 Clothing accessories textile nes
1301 Leather clothing
1302 Gloves leather
1411 Gloves cotton knit
1412 Gloves wool knit
1413 Gloves nylon knit
1414 Gloves textile nes
1419 Gloves knit nes
1421 Stockings socks cotton knit
1422 Stockings socks wool knit
1423 Stockings socks silk/art silk knit female
1424 Stockings socks silk/art silk knit male
1430 Shirts wool knit
1431 Shirt cotton knit
1432 Shirts textile nes knit
1433 Swimsuits cotton knit male
1436 Swimsuits cotton knit female
1437 Swimsuits wool knit female???
1439 Under garments cotton knit male
1440 Under garments wool knit male
1442 Under garments cotton knit female
1443 Under garments wool knit female
1445 Night garments cotton knit male
1446 Night garments wool knit male
1448 Night garments cotton knit female
1449 Night garments wool knit female
1450 Night garments textile nes knit female
1451 Under and night garments cotton knit infants
1452 Under and night garments wool knit infants
1458 Coats and suits cotton knit female
1459 Coats textile nes knit female
1460 Coats and suits wool knit female
1461 Jacket pullovers cotton knit male
1462 Jacket pullovers wool knit male
1463 Jacket pullovers textile nes knit male
1464 Jacket pullovers cotton knit female
1465 Jacket pullovers wool knit female
1466 Jacket pullovers textile nes knit female
1467 Skirt dresses cotton knit female
1468 Skirt dresses woll knit female
1469 Skirt dresses textile nes knit female
1470 Rompers sunsuits overalls cotton knit children
1471 Rompers overalls wool knit chidren
1473 Slacks shorts cotton knit male
1474 Slacks shorts wool knit male
1476 Slacks shorts cotton knit female
1477 Slacks shorts wool knit female
1478 Slacks shorts textile nes knit female
1479 Outer garments nes cotton knit male
1480 Outer garments nes wool knit male
1482 Outer garments nes cotton knit female
1483 Outer garments nes wool knit female
1484 Outer garments nes textile nes knit female
1485 Outer garments nes cotton knit infants
1486 Outer garments nes wool knit infants
1488 Blouses cotton knit female
1489 Blouses wool knit female
1490 Blouses textle nes knit female
1494 Suits uniforms cotton knit male
1495 Suits uniform wool knit male




1532 Headgear cotton fabric
1533 Headgear woolen fabric
1539 Headgear textile fabric nes
1602 Apparel and clothing accessories rubber
1713 Suits jackets MMF not knit male
1416 Overalls MMF not knit male
1719 Slacks shorts MMF not knit male
1722 Outer garments nes MMF not knit male
1733 Coats cloaks MMF not knit female
1736 Skirts dresses MMF not knit female
1739 Blouses MMF not knit-emb female
1742 Blouses MMF not knit emb female
1745 Overalls MMF not knit female
1748 Slacks shorts MMF not knit female
1751 Outer garments nes MMF not knit female
1754 Outer garments MMF not knit female
1762 Shirts MMF not dress
1764 Dress shirt MF not knit
1766 Swimsuit MMF not knit male
1769 Under garment MMF not knit male
1772 Night garments MMF not knit male
1782 Swimsuits MMF not knit female
1785 Under garments MMF not knit female
1788 Night garments MMF not knit female
1792 Under/Night garments MMF not knit infants
1832 Shirts MMF knit
1835 Swimsuits MMF knit male
1838 Swimsuits MMF knit female
1841 Under garments MMF knit male
1844 Under garments MMF knit female
1847 Night garments MMF knit male
1850 Night garments MMF knit female
1853 Under/Night garments MMF fibre knit infants
1860 Coats suits MMF knit female
1861 Suits uniforms MMF knit male
1863 Jackets pullovers MMF knit male
1866 Jackets pullovers MMF knit female
1869 Skirts dresses MMF knit female
1872 Rompers overalls MMF knit children
1875 Slacks shorts MMF knit male
1878 Slacks shorts MMF knit female
1881 Outer garments nes MMF knit male
1884 Outer garments nes MMF knit female
1887 Outer garments MMF knit infants
1890 Blouses MMF knit female
2010 Fur clothing
2020 Artifical fur clothing
Source: Hong Knog Trade Statistics, 1976
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